

Secret Intelligences and State Structures:

Transformation of the State Structures in the Case of
Russian Federation

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Major in International Relations

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SOGANG UNIVERSITY

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Abstract

The goal of this thesis is to examine influence of secret intelligences on transformation of state structures. The main research question is focused on Russian secret intelligence and its influence on transformation of the Post-Soviet Russia's state structures. The methods used in this study are qualitative research methods.

Since Napoleonic Wars the importance of secret intelligence had progressively increased. In the beginning, as a part of military crystallization, its scope and functions were limited and subordinated to military purposes. However, with the raise of 'political citizenship' and institutionalization of the state the need for 'social stabilizer' emerged, especially in countries with sensitive geopolitical positions and complex societies. As a result, secret intelligence's functions and purposes had diverged from the previous subordination to the military. Hence, both high military and civilian governing structures, which were in a quite discordance throughout XIX and early XX century, increased their dependence on secret intelligence.

If in the beginning secret intelligences were created due to changes in the concept of war, then throughout the time they become factor of changes of many political and social concepts. After the October Revolution, secret intelligence in Bolshevik Russia and later in Stalin's Soviet Union evolved from the state stabilizer into the nucleus of the state crystallization. Its scope and functions were broadened, and its distributive power within the state highly maximized. The secret intelligence under Stalin started to develop as another form of military crystallization, altering the previous concept of war. This directly had repercussion in US, causing creation of the re-

sembling 'new generation' secret intelligence. If the level of direct and open arm clashes between US and Soviet Union were low during the Cold War, it was only due to the nuclear deterrence and the fact that they were replaced with numerous covert actions conducted all over the world. With the progress in communication technology importance and power of secret intelligence strengthened even more. However, its real power should be tested only within the state. As institutional part of the state, Russian secret intelligence's distributive power increased, up to the point where it developed capabilities to alter and transform entire structure of the state. If this capability is confirmed in the case of the country where the 'new generation' secret intelligence originated from, then resembling secret intelligences could possess the same altering power and could create similar effects in situation of inner-state instability and great external threat.

Throughout the history Russia had shown tendencies to respond to the great external threat with the raise of 'garrison state' and inner social restrictive consolidation; in other words, with the 'service-class revolution.' Secret intelligence structure in the last decade of Soviet Union facing great external threat caused by SDI and internal instability, instigated by corruption within Nomenclature structure, tried to transform the state. Yet, at that time this was not possible. Failure in conducting the service-class revolution soon was followed by disintegration of the Soviet Union and the new political and economic tendencies for transformation of the state towards democracy with open market economy. The rise of the new business elite's power, further degradation of preserved Nomenclature structures, inner state instability caused by war in Chechnya and continuous

external threat caused by intensified US military actions in the world during 1990s, one more time alarmed the initiation of the service-class revolution. This time, secret intelligence structure was consolidated, and economy passed critical breaking-up stage giving abutment for the initiation of the Russian forth service-class revolution. From the mid-1990s Russian secret intelligence strengthened its power and started shifting transition and altering transformation of the state towards the new form of garrison state – ‘militocracy with open market economy.’ This form was adequate and up to date with domestic and international contemporary politico-socio-economical environment.

Empirical confirmation of my assumptions has been made through comparison of transition of Russian Federation with the ex-Soviet states which successfully passed transition towards democracy with open market economy, and with some ex-communist state that resemble Soviet model in terms of comparable development of secret intelligences’ structures. It implies that Russian secret intelligence influenced transformation of the post-Soviet Russia’s state structures.

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Chapter I. Introduction

The real understanding of secret intelligence and its influence on state structuring hasn't been feasible until recent times. The last decade of twentieth century revealed a string of 'sacred secrets.'¹ In the Pavel Sudoplatov's autobiography *Special Tasks*² some facts regarding 'Manhattan Project' were disclosed for the first time. This initiated public release of the VENONA transcripts by US government in 1995,³ which revealed Soviet spying activities in US from 1939 – 1946. Soon, it started to be clear that our preceding apprehension regarding secret intelligences had been partial and limited by the nature of the issue itself. Especially, true understanding of Russian secret intelligence and its importance had been always shadowed by the closeness and impermeableness of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

1.1 The Puzzle and the Main Focus of the Paper

Secret intelligence has been usually seen as government body created for the state security purposes, hence with restricted functions and scopes. However, with the secret intelligences' increased involvement in covert operations, in the post-Second World War period, a question regarding their function and their real power within the state has arisen. The puzzle of my paper is related to this question.

¹ Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, *Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc, 2002), preface, xxv.

² Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1994).

³ Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–158.

Therefore:

- What is the relation between secret intelligences and state structures? Are the secret intelligences able to influence formation and transformation of state structures?

Some disclosed facts in the last decade has given me a reason to believe that importance of Russia's secret intelligence, not solely for the Russia's inner state transformations but also for the 'higher level' transformation of the modern state structures in general, was far beyond our previous perceptions. As a product of unique social idiosyncrasy Russia's secret intelligence directly influenced transformation of the Russia's state structures after October Revolution, and indirectly after the Second World War through the formation of US secret intelligence and secret intelligences of some other countries.

- Therefore, my main focus will be Russia's secret intelligence and their influence on transformation of the state structures in the period of post-Soviet Russia when this influence was the most notable.

1.2 Research Hypothesis

In accordance with the puzzle of the paper, the hypothesis of this paper would be:

- Secret intelligence can influence transformation of the state structures.

Russia's secret intelligence played the most important role in transformation of Russia's state structures twice: First time in the period after October Revolution up to Stalin's death; Second time after 1991 throughout the transition period of Russian Federation; with the highest influence on transformation during Putin's presi-

dency. Throughout the first period the formation of state structures and secret intelligence were two ongoing simultaneous processes. Both of them had parallel passing stages of transformation and consolidation. Real influence of secret intelligence on transformation of state structures in this juvenile period of the state structures crystallization is not sufficient as a proof for my hypothesis. Even if the impact of secret intelligence on transformation of state structures in the first period was considerable, its analysis would be used only as intro for the empirical evaluation of the hypothesis regarding second period in which state structures transformation was shifted and altered by influence of secret intelligence.

Thus, in accordance with aforementioned and in accordance with the main focus of the paper I am going to specify more my hypothesis:

- Secret intelligence has played important role in transformation of post-Soviet Russia's state structures.

1.3 Theoretical Analysis and Methods of Study

My theoretical approach is closely related with historical time line of modern state development and crystallization of its structures. I assume that the appearance of the first institutionalized form of secret intelligence, in chronological order, corresponds with: the emergence of modern state; its ideological, economic, military, and political entwined transformations; the development of its military structures and following evolution of the concept of war. Therefore, in the first part of the paper I will try to determinate the place of secret intelligence within development of modern state using 'The Social Theory of Michael Mann' presented in *The Sources of Social Power*.

After determining the place of secret intelligence within development of modern state, I am going to continue with the more specific research regarding Russia as the country which has developed one of the most important secret intelligences. Specific idiosyncrasy of Russian society suitable for development of powerful secret intelligence will be examined through theoretical framework of Richard Hellie's 'Russia's service-class revolution theory.'⁴

Chronological advancement constricted by the above mentioned theory will encircle the period of Russia's state from the time of its creation, up to these days. Finally, in the part of the paper dedicated to the empirical evaluation of the hypothesis, I am going to merge previously used theories with theories related to Russia's post-communist elites and nomenclature structures. This would give us opportunity to set our own theoretical approach and to pose subsequent conclusions.

– As methods of study I am going to use historical-comparative and deductive methods. Secondary analysis of data as a method will prevail only in the last chapter dedicated to conformation of the hypothesis. Empirical evolution of the hypothesis will be based on comparative case study between two groups of ex-socialist states which differ in the level of development and independence of secret intelligence. First group is comprised of ex-Soviet Union states: Visegrad group states, Baltic group states, Bulgaria and Romania, and some ex-Yugoslavia states. All of them had successfully passed transition period in 1990s toward democracy with open market economy. They had developed secret intelligences, however quite

⁴ Richard Hellie, "The Structure of Russian Imperial History," *History and Theory*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Dec. 2005), pp. 88–112.

subordinated to the KGB and with the level of development which couldn't affect transformation of the state. Second group is composed of states such as Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro and Albania which had developed strong and independent secret intelligences to the level which affected transformation of those states in 1990s toward democracy with open market economy. In the case of Russian Federation, which had the most developed secret intelligence among all benchmark states, transformation toward democracy with open market economy had been highly affected by its secret intelligence and even shifted toward a new form of state: militocracy with open market economy.

Chapter II. Secret Intelligences and Development of the Modern State

2.1 Michael Mann's Theory of Social Power

For my analysis, it is important to determinate the notion of social power. What is it, who has it, how it has been distributed and what are the sources of social power? This time/space (history/state) approach is necessary because the development of the state structures is a dynamic process; it has its own pace and rhythm throughout the history of human society. When we say that social power is the ability of an actor to change the incentives of other actors in order to bring about outcomes, it means that almost everyone in society can have different levels of social power. A degree of someone's social power depends on distributive and collective power that each person has in a society.

“Distributive power is the power of actor A over actor B. For B to acquire more distributive power, A must lose some. But collective power is the joint power of actors A and B cooperating to exploit nature or another actor C.”⁵

The following changes in contribution of those two kinds of social powers to the overall level of social power could be of help to understand when, why and how have the secret intelligences started playing an important role in development of modern state. At the same time it could reveal some new aspects of state structures crystallizations in XX century, especially in the period after October Revolution up to these days. At first, changes in the representation of

⁵ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), p. 2.

distributive and collective power within western societies were not caused by the increased role of secret intelligence. They were just circumstances of many historically important events.

According to Michael Mann, 'no significant generalization' cannot be made in defining the source which is structuring human society.⁶ Even though there are four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political; each of them doesn't have primacy in shaping and determining human society. It is more the human tendency towards personification of nature and society that is making the above mentioned generalizations and simplified approaches. The human thinking has this malfunction; therefore, most of the time, the perception we grasp about our social environment is narrow and usually placed in tight frames of contemporary interpreted history.

As Michael Man points out, most of sociological and historical theories have dichotomized society in their approaches. These dichotomies such as feudal/industrial (Saint-Simon), metaphysical/scientific (Comte), militant/industrial (Spenser), feudalism/capitalism (Smith, the political economists, and Marx), status/contract (Maine), community/association (Tonnie), mechanical/organic forms of the division of labor (Durkheim), or even Weber who did not dichotomize, saw history as a singular rationalization process.⁷

The theories formed in this way are very tempting and attractive for human mind, giving mirror reflection of our logical patterns, confirming both ourselves and brilliancy of well refined human deduction. The importance of some of them was significant and deci-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

sive for real world and real social events on historical time line. Hence, it is not possible to neglect them since all those theories found their places at least as historical events, with bigger or smaller importance for development of human society.

In following analysis I will adopt the way Michael Mann's described and understood four sources of social power:

"The four power sources are not like billiard balls, which follow their own trajectory, changing direction as they hit each other. They 'entwine' that is, their interactions change one another's inner shapes as well as their outward trajectories."⁸

"Ideological, economic, military, and political transformations and class and national struggles were multiple, entwined, and developing interstitially... The whole was a nonsystematic, nondialectical process between historically given institutions and emergent interstitial forces."⁹

Basically the formation of modern state was the result of capitalist, representative, national and militarist, entwined nonsystematic state crystallizations. For my research, military social power source, that is military crystallization, is of the greatest concern. However, following Mann's basic idea of modern state multiple crystallization, I will try not to put aside any aspect of entwined interaction of four above mentioned crystallizations in period after October Revolution, especially period after the Second World War, which was not analyzed in Michael Mann's *The Source of Social Power*.

The importance of secret intelligences as a part of military crystallization hasn't been given a lot of attention. In many cases it was put aside or even neglected. The name secret intelligence in common mind always brings association with spies, secret services, things

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

mostly seen in James Bond movies or read in spy books. It is interesting that this common thinking is widely spread. Secret services as any other institutions have their own history and historical periods in which they haven't been institutionalized, but none the less their significance was not lower than the role they are playing in the contemporary world. It is necessary for these periods to be analyzed in the same manner as the period after October Revolution and put in the new context which could reveal real essence and importance for this aspect of military crystallization. In following chapters which are related to my case study – Russia in the post-Cold War period, I will have a chance to go deeper into direct as well as retrograde analysis.

Michael Mann's theory of modern state is very useful to be started with: "The state is not functional but 'foul-up.'",¹⁰ His analysis finishes with the First World War as a case study. In his work there is not enough about development of Russian modern state which has rather unique and different path than development of the western states, such as Britain, France, United States, Austro-Hungary, Prussian-German state. According to my hypothesis the secret intelligences have played very important role in determination-crystallization of state structures. Here, we have to point out that the difference between secret services and secret intelligence is important to be understood well, because secret services as a part of a state bureaucracy emerged in later periods of modern state, whilst secret intelligences have their roots and have existed even in periods prior to the emergence of modern state. However, I am going to examine only the ones that are closely related with our hypothesis, in other words not the secret intelligences that were deeply rooted within pre modern but

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

the secret intelligences that have become a part of social culture, the intrinsic way one society has functioned. Actually, there are only few states with this idiosyncrasy.

It's not only that Russia has developed in unique way, different from the way of the western countries, but: the role it has played after 1917, the influence that it had on entire modern world and especially on the emergence of secret services as the key role players within the modern state in post-Second World War period, is making it a candidate number one for both my case study and the development of my theoretical framework.

Even though trajectories of the four state crystallizations were entwined, all four of the same importance, in my analysis I will put more attention to military crystallization. According to Michael Mann:

“State's ‘military crystallization’ was dual: geopolitical, prosecuting external war, and domestic, repressing discontent. Both remained, but they were also transformed.”¹¹

In western societies the period from 1760 up to the end of Second World War was a period of frequent wars. Domestic and geopolitical militarism were the most important factor – a source of social power that had dictated and routed actions of nation-states and entire international society. The lack of strong international organization before creation of the UN, has given more power to the military creating civil/military dichotomy within the state government.

Actually, the nature of war was a predominant element for defining system of international relations and nation-state itself. Chaotic – anarchic element brought by war (and created by war) has made international system dependant on changes or evolution of the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 403.

concept of war. This is a practical dependence, or more precisely an essential dependence. The reason for this lies in the international system composed of nation-states and the concept of nation-state itself. They have their existence only due to war or permanent threat of war.

The period from 1760 onwards was the period of the first and the second industrial revolution; hence big military build up due to new inventions, technologies, some unsettled bills and long history of animosity between European countries. Changing the nature of war: the way, the speed, its lethality – the number of casualties it can produce, preferring attack over defense or vice versa, etc., has reflection on power structuring of the state. Military predominance in the modern state, until the end of Second World War, was destructive for the theoretical concept of modern democratic state as much as the practical destructions it caused. It seems that practice and theory haven't followed each other after the end of Second World War. This claim may sound rigid. However, later on when I discuss more about changes that occurred in the post-Second World War period within international community and especially regarding the concept of war, this assumption will become plainer.

Military crystallization has two dimensions both originated from the basic functions of military within the state: maintaining domestic order/war and preparing for war; repression/war. Western history witnessed a major transformation of military power – from dual function (war/repression) to singular (war), detaching militaries from class struggle.¹² The reason for this could be reutilization and surveillance provided by the records and timetables of public and private adminis-

¹² Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European states, AD 990-1990* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)

tration,¹³ that is growing of state infrastructures, its administrative apparatus. Many other theoreticians, like Foucault, Giddens, Dandeker and Elieas, would also agree “that social order in Western society – apart from American inner cities – is buttressed by far less repression than in most historic societies and that this leaves the military largely pointing outward.”¹⁴ On the other hand Michael Mann’s opinion is that the reason for reduction of military functions should be sought in the development of ‘political’ and ‘social’ citizenship. As an argument for his claim Mann evinced that in Third World militaries still point inward.¹⁵

The idea behind all this arguments is similar; therefore, the differences between them are minor. Transformation of the modern state was cause of transformation/reduction of military functions. For now I will accept this assumption. However, it is necessary to say that it isn’t only transformation or development of modern state the one that influenced transformation of military functions, it is also transformation of the concept of war that diverged and mutated traditional, inward/outward, domestic/geopolitical, dualistic division of military functions. As I mentioned before, the concept of war has dramatically changed during the post-Second World War period. Only through perspective of these changes the previous periods should be reexamined.

For this research domestic militarism as ‘repressive militarism’ presented in three forms ‘*show, presence and violence*,’¹⁶ is not of a big importance, at least not until the post-Second World War period

¹³ Michael Mann, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 408.

when domestic military crystallization has taken different forms in western societies, especially its form of *presence*. It is a fact that throughout the development of western modern state repressive militarism has decreased. Its third form has almost lost significance and usage in western democracies as the war became more professional, with the gun technologies that were delivering too little show and bang, too much death, on crowds.¹⁷ Yet, it has been used as a means of repression in many states which couldn't develop well institutionalized labor relations, or political and social citizenship; or, who had military and repression as a part of state tradition, deeply incorporated within culture and society.

Geopolitical militarism is related to military crystallization with outward pointing direction. War is seen as the most ruthless competition known to human societies and the continuous learning process.¹⁸ Diplomacy as a part of geopolitical militarism was developed even before development of nation-state with many different purposes. In the beginning its scope was narrow, mostly dealing with negotiating alliances, promotion to the status of kingdom, cross-state royal marriages, etc. Later on,

“traditional diplomats and foreign ministries have seen themselves as the expert on weighing up foreign states and their politics and intentions, using ‘secret intelligence’ as an input on the margins; now diplomatic reports are sometimes seen as just one source of material for intelligence evaluation.”¹⁹

Even though, before XIX century democratization, military and foreign policy had exclusively been a part of the royal matter, they had been more transparent and homogenous in sense that king and his

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 410.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

closest aristocratic circle had constitutional and executive autonomy over military and foreign policy issues. At that time secrecy in those two domains was unnecessary and even undesirable. However, the growth of civil society – enhance of collective power, especially after the French Revolution, democratization of regimes and transformation of monarchies into democratic constitutional monarchies brought big divergence within western societies. However, it turned out that the previously mentioned royal prerogatives continued to be in the same hands. Even though the main decisions in making foreign policy and military issues resided with Parliament, routine – everyday foreign policy did not require the consent of Parliament and largely remained private.²⁰ And ‘private’ suggests - in the hands of the previous state elite, as Mann explains:

“Monarchs and executives did not alone decide routine foreign policy. They took advice from professional diplomats. These diplomats were drawn from a narrow social base, overwhelmingly from the old regime: monarch’s kin, aristocracy, gentry, and old money capitalist.”²¹

The proportion of nobles among Prussian high diplomats fluctuated only between 68 percent and 79 percent. In Austria it was between 63 percent and 84 percent. Michael Mann also points out that in 1914, the German corps of ambassadors consisted of eight princes, twenty-nine counts, twenty barons, fifty-four untitled nobles, and only eleven commoners.²²

In France of all the ambassadors between 1815 and 1885, 73 percent had aristocratic surnames.²³

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 415.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

The British Foreign Office and diplomatic service, through this period and up to 1914, remained dominated by the old regime. It was stuffed at the top by the second sons of the aristocracy and wealthy gentry, educated at top public schools.²⁴

According to Warren Ilchman²⁵ in the United States situation was similar; diplomatic corps was staffed with sons of old, wealthy families, with at least 60 percent of them who had attended Harvard, Yale, or Princeton.

Transformation of state elites never occurs suddenly, or should never occur suddenly, with dramatic cuts. It is an ongoing process and, as any other process, it has its own time line. Even in cases of revolutions (as it has been stated for France) there was continuity between old and new elites. It is a kind of symbiotic relation, and it is not completely restricted for period in which modern state has emerged and developed; however, it has started to become more represented in civil developed societies. It is domestic survival of old elites and international acceptance of the new.

“The old regime spoke foreign languages, traveled extensively abroad, married foreign wives, and was cultural cosmopolitans.”²⁶

This crisscross implication corresponds with rising of nation-state/international community, and increase in lethality of war. ‘Grand-implication’ was brought by first and second industrial revolutions. The changes in the concepts of war caused by technological improvements might have been the most significant cause for the formation of broader international community. The changes in the

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Warren Ilchman, *Professional Diplomacy in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961)

²⁶ Michael Mann, *op. cit.*, p. 418.

gun power were followed by the changes in war code and nature of army itself, with the shift toward nation armies. Everything was possible after French Revolution. Old royal alliances and marriage relations lost their importance. Complexity of the four entwined state crystallizations started taking in the new intra and inter states actors.

More people could lose their lives, in shorter time. Actually, the second reason has the biggest impact on human psychology. Human nature is composed in the way that sudden changes could produce the biggest mental disharmony and rise fear. War was more brutal and maybe more devastated in periods before XVIII century. However, both military and civilian technological innovations shrank the time and geographically extended possible spheres of war.

Industrial revolution made new incentives, opportunities in new worlds, changes in the way of production, urbanization, awareness of private property; though, all people started to face the same fear.

Possessions and decisions were not anymore in the hands of kings and aristocrats. This was the period, and those were the points where collective and distributive power merged into new entwined relation. Simplicity was broken. New dialectical balance emerged within ‘modern’ society, among every single member, simultaneously raising collective and challenging distributive power.

“If social actors become aware of ongoing structural transformations, they may seek to resist them. But if, as here, transformations enhance collective powers, they are more likely to seek to harness modernization to their own interests. Their ability to do so depends on their distributive power.”²⁷

This social pattern was kind of new social paradigm that overtook all its representatives both from new and old regime. For old elite –

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

aristocracy, collective power, previously of less importance, became the surviving tool, like basic instinct that had brought coherence and formed the new cast. Its function was related to the state structures in which prerogatives were given according to expertise and state's international relations strategies, found in royalty originated network.

Recognition indicates power. At the same time recognition creates (collective) self-awareness. Self-awareness raises distributive power. Within outgoing structural transformation of western societies in the late XVIII and XIX century, the new elite as an actor with the biggest social pretension was seeking self-awareness, coherence and recognition less in domestic social environment and more abroad, on international stage.

Structural transformation of the modern state was shifted towards hierarchically higher level of social structuring, which was intrinsically related with emerging and developing civil society – international level. The reason for this was not solely the industrial revolution and new technological breakthroughs. As Michael Mann stated the systemic approach in analyzing and presenting development of the modern state is not so plausible due to the fact that

“For diverse crystallization to result in a singular systemic state would require not only extraordinary organizing abilities by state officials but also extraordinary political interest by civil society actors.”²⁸

Starting from French Revolution, historical events that happened in many different areas of western and later international society created a net of entwined state crystallizations forming new, and up to that time, hardly recognized social structure, rudiment of modern civil society.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

As the crystallizations of western states were entwined, so were the newly emerged elite and the old elite. The shift from distributive to collective power brought dichotomy among most of the actors of newly emerged civil society, at the same time binding them to and estranging them from the state. Closeness was reflected in the ability to participate in decision making process; thus, the entire society was enclosed by domestic politics. Yet, the most important ‘outward’ part of the modern state was kept by residuum and descendants of previous elite.

Notwithstanding, war stopped to be solely the functional focal point of nobles. New regimes managed to insulate overwhelming influence of the old elites giving them, in terms of domestic politics, restrictive areas of military and diplomacy. This insulation, in the early years of the modern state, closed military into functionally autonomic cocoon creating almost independent bureaucratic structure which will prevail in spite of all the crises and wars of XIX and XX century.

Restrictions that new regimes were facing with, regarding inability for completely taking over the power and political credibility (mostly in international arena) from previous aristocratic elite, started to be the cause of even greater consolidation of old elite into firm monolithic state structure with almost limitless autonomy; within, at that time, juvenile civil society.

According to Michael Mann’s analysis, military structures in western societies in XVIII and XIX century were mostly influenced and held by old elites.

“Only 5 percent to 10 percent of French army officers were nonnoble.”²⁹

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

However, in France representation of nobles within military structure fluctuated in periods after Napoleonic wars with the increase at the highest level in Bourbon monarchy.

“Even in Republican France the highest ranks remained fairly aristocratic. In 1870, 39 percent of division generals were of noble origin; in 1901, they were still 20 percent.”³⁰

In Britain, “the officer corps of the home army was almost entirely old regime: its highest ranks predominantly aristocratic; its lower, country gentry.”³¹ Noble dominance remained impressive. In Britain aristocrats and landed gentry supplied 40 percent of officers in the home army in 1780 and 41 percent in 1912. In the highest ranks their dominance fell slightly, from 89 percent in 1830 to 64 percent in 1912.³²

In Austria nobles comprised about 95 percent of Austrian generals between 1804 and 1859, then the proportion plummeted to 41 percent by 1908. In Prussia they held steady at about 90 percent until 1897 and then fell only to 71 percent in 1908.³³

Lower down the hierarchy noble’s dominance dropped more with expansion in the late XIX century. In spite of bureaucratization and professionalization of military “education did not replace older, noble criteria or radicalize military politics. It was fused into them.”³⁴

Michael Mann assumes that the main reason for this was simply not enough nobles to go around with the late XIX century expansion. However, bureaucratization and professionalization allowed this

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

³² P. E. Razzell, “Social Origins of officers in the Indian and British home army: 1758–1962,” *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep. 1963), pp. 248–260.

³³ Michael Mann, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 430.

structure to manage situation without harming the cohesion in military nobility network, and making disturbance in their collective power.

The United States and Russia had somehow different situation. US didn't have nobles, but on the other hand it had another unique feature.

“The army officer corps was old-family, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, rural, upper-middle class – as close to being an old regime as the United States provides. Army was domain of its own, independent and isolated by its peculiar customs and discipline; an aristocracy by selection and the halo of tradition.”³⁵

In the Russian army, the proportion of non-noble officers also increased, from 26 in 1895 to 47 percent in 1911, while the remaining nobles were not tied to the great Russian aristocracy. By 1903, 91 percent of those with at least a major general's rank possessed no land or property, not even urban dwelling. This officer corps also became segregated from the class structures.³⁶

If we look at these facts through the prism of some theories of civil society, we could grasp some new meanings and consequences of transformations that happened within the western societies in the XIX and XX century. According to T. H. Marshall there were three phases of citizenship evolution. The first one involved legal or 'civil' citizenship that had been obtained through eighteenth century. The second phase happened in the late XIX and early XX century in which 'political' citizenship was secured. The third related to 'social'

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 435.

citizenship phase is the latest one that took its part throughout the XX century.³⁷

Evolution of the civil society followed power transition and transformation of modern state's elites and military state structures starting from the French Revolution, throughout the XIX and early XX century up to the October Revolution. Even though XIX and early XX transformations within western societies' military structures followed restructuring of military cadres, these transformations on the other hand did not have the same social origin and consequences on further XX century transformation of Russian state.

2.2 Secret Intelligences and the Concept of War

Secret intelligence as a part of the process of information gathering and negotiation has been a part of diplomacy since Renaissance. Its development followed the development of nation-state and scope of its institutional enlargement. The bigger the need for information, the more institutionalized diplomatic system became.

Somehow, secret intelligences activities related with gaining information have always been a backstage part of diplomacy. Most of the embassies had secret funds for buying information. However, institutionalization of secret intelligences was a bit sluggish as far as gathering of information had defense and national security preservation purposes; or until monarchy, as the type of regime, prevailed.

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars made two significant changes: the first one, regarding the concept of citizenship, and the second one regarding the concept of war. Ordinary people

³⁷ T. H. Marshall, *Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays* (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 67–127.

started obtaining ‘political’ citizenship, via voting power and participation in parliament. Collective/Distributive power balance was at that time overweighed on the part of collective power.

New social circumstances, transformation of feudalistic states, changes of regimes and transition of elites, just followed fluctuations in the contemporary collective consciousness. In this situation, as I mentioned before, old regime’s elite started changing domestic strategy according to the conditions of the newly emerged social system in western societies.

European royal network of the previous times still were holding even in tighter binding, enhancing its collective power by closing in within the essential autonomous segments of the state’s military and diplomacy. This cohesion was not only state related; it also had ‘inter’ state character. By giving each other (in meaning of inter state recognition) credibility in international arena, old elites were fighting, in the beginning, for bare survival. However, later with deeper integration within military and diplomatic structures they have started altering new social system both on state and international level, enhancing their power.

Intelligence as a part of battlefield reconnaissance, only after the Napoleonic Wars, became essential part of military operations.

“Eighteenth – century intelligence was still set in a military framework described by one writer as the ‘stone age of command,’ slowly changing but still in transition through the Napoleonic Wars.”³⁸

As the French Revolution changed concept of civil society and scope of citizenship, so did Napoleon with the concept of war.

³⁸ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), p. 14.

Changes in society were followed by changes in civilian concern and involvement with the war.

“Before Napoleon, opposing armies were commanded by nobles and the accepted code was that once they had each other in check there would be no fight. Napoleon pushed on with the attack, long after his enemies assumed that he was going to stop, maintaining a constant element of surprise.”³⁹

The wider was the scope of ‘political’ citizenship, the bigger were the casualties; war became ‘our’ matter under ‘our’ jurisdiction. Even Napoleon himself took part in battles side by side with his soldiers to give example and raise moral of his soldiers.

Nevertheless, devastations caused by the ‘new type’ of the war were so high that sometimes war was losing its purpose and started turning from a combat into butchery. When collective power is enhanced within socially inexperienced young – newly created layers of society, and especially if this change is sudden and massive, the entire domestic and international social system can be in danger. This was the reason which brought Geneva Convention in 1864.

As I mentioned, the majority of military corps, especially high ranks, prevailed aristocratic, in hands of the old elite. Even though Napoleon broke war concepts and codes of previous times, the old elite transformed by the new social environment and historical circumstances, managed to rein pant devastating wars which were draining western societies in XIX century.

Regarding Intelligence, “the wars demonstrated the use of intelligence, but did little to institutionalize it.”⁴⁰ However, it was too early at that time to expect for secret intelligence to become institution-

³⁹ “Change of Tactics,” <http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/N/napoleon/battle.html> (Search date: 2007/03/14)

⁴⁰ Michael Herman, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

alized within the military structures which were going through processes of transition and consolidation. Institutionalization usually comes after bureaucratization and professionalization which required period of progressive and well organized statecraft.

“Intelligence as information is as old as government; so too is secret intelligence. But until the mid-nineteenth century, there was little in the way of specialized, permanent intelligence institutions. Controlling collection and evaluating the results were integral parts of statecraft and military command. Intelligence as an institution was a Victorian Innovation.”⁴¹

Here, I would like to emphasize again the importance of the First Industrial Revolution that initiated changes in societies even on a global scale (if Industrial Revolution is considered as one of the major causes for deterioration of Chinese Empire).

Military and military commands were not the same as they use to be prior to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Victorian period was just aftermath of growing capitalist crystallization caused by the First Industrial Revolution within the most advanced country at that time. It was not surprisingly that emergence of the first institutionalized Intelligence happened in Britain; moreover, it also confirms Michael Mann’s assumption of four entwined modern state’s crystallizations.

Even though British secret intelligence was the first institutionalized Intelligence, it wasn’t the most significant in terms of global influence on formation of other secret intelligences and ‘inner’ and ‘inter’ transformation of societies. Intelligence’s associated activities traditionally reflect offensive-defensive role of both intelligence and security agencies. The second role emerged only in the late XIX cen-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

tury in the time of British hegemonic expansion and expansion of power of the military 'post-transition' structures.

2.3 Institutionalization of Secret Intelligences

Whenever we think about secret intelligences we usually make pre-assumption which is linking hegemonic country with the most powerful secret intelligence. This misleading heritage of the post-Second World War is closing our perception in frames of wrong hermeneutics, and sometime can interrupt researches in this area; the same matrix and matching analogies were sought in the past.

So far, concerning the period of modern state development, there were only two hegemonic states US and Britain. However, even though the first form of institutionalized secret intelligence appeared in Britain, its impact and influence on social transformations of the western societies was not as big as secret intelligence of one other country with very peculiar and complex social structure. Russia can be mistakenly placed within western societies despite the fact it triggered their changes and transformations in the XX century.

According to Michael Herman:

“The change in intelligence’s status came from the new military technology of the second half of the nineteen century and its effects on command.”⁴²

Starting from the XIX century, institutionalization of military was rapid and necessary because of domestic social-strategic reasons, and for the state security reasons. Capitalism in most of colonial European countries was far beyond the stage of ‘merchant capitalism.’

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

‘Industrial and laissez-faire capitalism’ made big European colonial powers even wealthier and more powerful.

Social transformation regarding transition of old elites that was happening in almost all European countries was not synchronized, or more correctly, reciprocal to the transition from ‘merchant’ stage of capitalism to ‘industrial and laissez-faire stage.’

In Prussia and Russia, with their much younger manufacturing bases, mercantilism continued to find favor after other states had turned to newer doctrines. On the other side in order to compensate this disadvantage the Prussian and the Russian started developing and strengthening their military structures. In the beginning of XIX century,

“the influential model was Prussian General Staff, which had been slowly taking shape after 1815 and acquired great prestige after the victories over Austria and France in 1866 and 1870. By about the turn of century most countries had adopted some version of it.”⁴³

Even though Britain was commercial hegemon, in terms of military hegemony only its defensive capabilities were hegemonic; with unbeatable naval force. Its geographical position, size, geopolitical environment, and mostly the concept of war of that time prevented Britain to establish itself as a complete hegemon.

However, the same circumstances triggered establishment of the first War Intelligence Branch in 1873 and an Indian Intelligence Branch in 1878. This was basically the need of the time that just followed changes and improvement in military technology. Other western societies followed the same route. For example:

⁴³ *Ibid.*

“In the United States the Navy and Army Intelligence Departments were founded in 1882 and 1885.”⁴⁴

The period of the biggest secret intelligence activity in the US, prior to establishment of CIA in 1947, was during colonial times:

“In the late eighteenth century, alone, colonial political leaders like George Washington (and almost every president to follow) secretly appointed a total of 400 special agents to conduct activities with or against foreign countries.”⁴⁵

This kind of political decisions and actions at that time were not part of any institutionalized Intelligence, as the first ones were established in 1882 and 1885. Moreover, they were hardly legitimate because they were not disclosed to the other branches of government “by explaining that Congress simply consisted of too many members to be able to keep a secret.”⁴⁶ The United States secret intelligence’s operations and its importance after colonial throughout XIX and the first half of XX century were less and without big inner and inter state effects.

Entwined four crystallizations in the early XIX century western states were not the same in proportion and they diverged from state to state. Disparity between different stages of capitalism between colonial and non-colonial European states was compensated by intensive crystallization of military structure, especially in Prussia. This kind of state structure crystallization started estranging military from civilian control even though civil society and ‘political’ citizenship had been progressively developed in all European countries except Russia.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴⁵ Marcus Eyth, “The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or Not to Disclose – That is the Question,” *BYU Journal of Public Law*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Fall 2002), p. 47.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

The main reason for formation of British Secret Service Bureau in 1909 was the fear of German espionage:

“Initially an offshoot of military intelligence, the home (counterespionage) section eventually evolved into the independent Security Service.”⁴⁷

The development of the first institutionalized secret intelligence was expected to be placed in hegemon country. However, its defensive purpose was the reflection of the real balance of power in Europe and of the different path of social and state development triggered by unsynchronized transition from ‘merchant’ to ‘industrial and laissez-faire’ stage of capitalism between European states.

In Prussia and later in Germany this was the cause of higher military crystallization and estrangement of military into autonomous, and regarding authority, independent and dominated state structure out of civilian control, which finally resulted in the First World War.

The importance of British secret intelligence was not solely related to commercial hegemony and high level of institutionalized statecraft. Secrecy in Britain had both political and social context. David Vincent suggests that Britain is a particularly secretive society for two main reasons: the social and political depth of the country’s secrecy and the cultural rather institutionalized nature of it.⁴⁸

For Prussia/Germany high military crystallization was a necessity of catching up economically more advanced powers. Nevertheless, for Russia the same type of crystallization was duo contextual, indicating two different contexts; one as a political consequence and the other as a social heritage.

⁴⁷ Michael Herman, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁴⁸ David Vincent, *The Culture of Secrecy in Britain 1832-1998* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), Introduction.

If the development of secret intelligence is predisposed by idiosyncrasy of society, then later, when a society is institutionally framed by the state, the development of the state itself could be effected by anachronistic nature of customary secrecy of that society. Both Britain and Russia had some idiosyncratic marks in their societies that made them propitious for establishment of secret intelligences.

It was not only the fear of foreign espionage that triggered formation of British Secret Service, as B. Porter points out:

“It cannot be a mere accident that these successive entrenchments of the principle that governments could choose their own targets for surveillance roughly coincided with the moments of greatest labour and popular unrest in modern Britain: 1844, 1889, 1911, 1920.”⁴⁹

In accordance with previous assumption G. Minkley and M. Legassick claim:

“Official Secrets Acts were also directed in practice more at unknown future ‘subversives’ than at the foreign spies who provided their excuses.”⁵⁰

In Russia, alike Britain, the formation of secret intelligence was caused by the fear of mass revolution, communism and anarchism. The earliest institutionalized form of secret policing was Russian Third Section of The Imperial Chancery founded in 1826, which was succeeded by the *Okhrana*, and later by its communist descendants *Cheka* and *KGB*.

⁴⁹ B. Porter, “Boarder or day Boy,” *London Review of Books* 21 (July 15, 1999), p. 13.

⁵⁰ G. Minkley and M. Legassick, ““Not Telling:” Secrecy, Lies, and History,” *History and Theory, Theme Issue* 39 (Dec. 2000), p. 2.

All of this could lead to the conclusion that both British and Russian secret intelligences were formed for the purposes of inner protection of the state against great labour and popular unrest.

“The Okhrana was created in 1881 in response to the assassination of Alexander II. Its primary mission was to protect the tsar, the royal family, and the Russian autocracy itself.”⁵¹

The biggest part of the society lost the chance of colluding with aristocracy of the previous regime; more correctly, they didn't represent the new elite. However, measuring in terms of collective power and considering new social circumstances they had the same social weight and importance as much as the old and the new elite.

The old elites, closed in cocoon of autonomous military, because of the outward direction had started losing a grip over domestic affairs placing self in the great danger of possible mass revolution which was finally spread within Europe in the 1848. Interesting is the fact that

“The United Kingdom, Russian and Ottoman Empires were the only major European states to go without a national revolution over this period.”⁵²

In spite of British and Russian social idiosyncrasies propitious for establishment of the first secret services, the biggest difference between those two countries was: Britain was liberal and Russia was very illiberal with serfdom system in existence throughout entire XIX century.

⁵¹ Ben B. Fisher, “Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police,” History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency, 1997), <https://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/okhrana/5474-1.html> (Search date: 2007/03/21)

⁵² “Revolutions of 1848,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutions_of_1848 (Search date: 2007/03/22)

Moral virtues that had found British society were the ones of a gentleman, such as courage, truthfulness, honesty, unselfishness, generosity, modesty, composure, thoughtfulness, etc. The same ones had been layering society for centuries and had represented aspirations of any 'man of honour' which was the matter of birth, upbringing and type of education.

The class question again started to be very important within the XIX century high developed British civil society. Yet, this time in terms of inherited norms and behavior codex of previous times, dispersed through society layer of colluded noble and the new elite class.

"Official secrecy was exercised mainly by the upper middle classes. That was supposed to make it all right. In their hands it was called 'discretion,' 'reserve', or 'reticence,' gentlemanly qualities much admired at the time."⁵³

Lightened and modifications of extreme points of gentlemanery codes in the XIX century's solidified middle class, happened through acceptance of the mild representative characteristics of the 'man of honour,' the one that D. Vincent calls 'hidden depths.'⁵⁴

In well state-crafted Victorian Britain,

"gentleman could be entrusted with secret knowledge without fear that they would exploit it corruptly, factionally, or even 'bureaucratically.' As a result British secrecy was not to be confused with continental despotism, because in the end it was in the hands of men of honour."⁵⁵

On the other hand the situation regarding mass unrests and dissatisfaction in Russia was more critical and very different than in any other state in Europe. The lack of even 'civil' citizenship, centuries

⁵³ B. Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵⁴ David Vincent, *op. cit.*, Conclusion.

⁵⁵ G. Minkley and M. Legassick, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

lasting system of serfdom and military service-class based society, were just few of the many unique features of Russia which on liberty scale at that moment in Europe was at the bottom. This state from the liberation of Mongols has preserved itself as a ‘garrison state’ with the exception of couple of short periods that coincided with transition from one service class to another.

If I make analogy with a magnetic stick, we could say that Britain and Russia represented the opposite poles instigated by the inter part of geopolitical environment in highly magnetified XIX century Europe. Taking into account B. Porters words regarding secrecy in Britain:

“If this had been a less liberal country, it might well have become a less secretive one,”⁵⁶

it should be more understandable why those two countries which developed first secret intelligences had, each in its own way, a big impact on further modern state structures crystallizations and further development of ‘political’ citizenship.

In 1882, only two years after the establishment of Russian Empire Secret Police *Okhrana*, its foreign section – Okhrana’s Foreign Agency was established, centered in Paris,

“prompted by the shift of Russian revolutionary activity from the Russian Empire to Western and Central Europe. The new Bureau occupied two modest offices in the Russian Imperial Consulate at 97 Rue de Grenelle. Never very large (see the first reprinted article below, entitled, “Paris Okhrana 1885-1905”), the Paris bureau nonetheless proved effective.”⁵⁷

⁵⁶ B. Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁵⁷ Ben B. Fisher, *op. cit.*

Britain initially developed a secret intelligence to protect itself from foreign espionage; yet, basically to preserve social status quo and keep the elite safe.

Russian on the other hand initially developed a secret intelligence to protect elite and preserve unique centuries old service class social system. Yet, its extraterritorial character, its actions and the fact that *Okhrana* was secret police created for the state and not military purposes, started transforming the role and the functions of secret intelligence, making it at the same time part and apart of military state crystallization.

By the end of the XIX and in the early years of XX century, along with second industrial revolution the importance and the power of military structure increased to the very high level. Military intelligence changed its approach turning more to covert collection of information.

Two greatest secret intelligences, British and Russian, had a “long lasting British and Russian Great Game in Central Asia.”⁵⁸ Up to 1914 professionalization and the new scientific approach within military intelligence brought new restructuring and cohesion of the separate armed services departments. This path was followed by most of the western societies, with a bit late institutionalization of secret intelligence:

“The French Service de Renseignements re-established its position as the principal French collection agency of this kind in 1936, though it remained a military service. Amid the kaleidoscope of German intelligence organization in the Third Reich almost the only consistent feature was the position of

⁵⁸ Michael Herman, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

the Abwehr as the main espionage agency, though by no means the only one.”⁵⁹

However, the biggest divergence from this path of military intelligence crystallization happened in Russia after 1917, with the establishment of *Cheka* – the first Soviet Secret Police, on 20th December 1917; only two months after the October Revolution.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

Chapter III. Development of Russian Secret Intelligence

Although Russia geographically occupies East European land mass in social, cultural, religious, and many other aspects it has always been quite unique and rather different from the western societies.

In the XX century its role and significance in the international arena reached the pick. State and social transformations that happened in Russia after the October Revolution had both domestic and international repercussions. Since then, the balance of power within the western societies was dictated by different rules; the game became more complicated especially after 1930s and 1940s with Russian secret intelligence's 'invasion' in the western world. The type of actions, their legitimacy, their subversive purposes, in other words, one totally new and the way of conducting military secret operations, never seen before, shifted the development of civil society on a global scale.

If Napoleonic Wars were a turning point for breaking the past war codes and transformation of the concept of war, then the culmination of secret intelligence crystallization that overwhelmed entire military crystallization in 1930s and 1940s' Russia, was hierarchically even more significant. The changes which the Napoleonic Wars made in the concept of war were the response of the social changes and the emergence of 'political' citizenship. The changes that were made by the culmination of secret intelligence state crystallization since transformation of *Cheka* and following formation of Soviet Union in 1922 were the result of specific socially grounded way in which Russian state had been functioning for centuries. Therefore, those changes

were at the same time both, the effect of one archaic centuries old social stereotype, and the cause of distortion of newly emerged ‘social’ citizenship within western societies. Yet, this distortion was made only indirectly. The main cause for the formation of CIA in 1947 was *Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del* – NKVD spies’ activities and preparation for the covered actions on territory of US during 1930s and 1940s.⁶⁰

This had a big impact on transformation of ‘Victorian’ concept of secret intelligence which diverted the main focus of secret intelligences from the covered collection of information to the covered actions. Even though these transformations were a part of western societies’ XX century history, their initiation was socially and geopolitically anachronous, triggered by state with completely different social and cultural imprint.

3.1 Early Rus’ Period

Russian history can be divided into 3 parts: Early, Pre-Petrine Russia (900-1689), Imperial Russia (1689-1917) and the Twentieth Century Russia. Regarding the complexity of this topic, I am going to emphasize only the most important points and events in Russian history trying to interpret them according to the main intention and purpose of this paper.

Russian pre-Petrine history is comprised of three periods: Early Rus’ and the rise of Muscovy (900-1462); the expansion, consolida-

⁶⁰ Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–158.

tion and the crisis of Muscovy (1462-1613); and the early Romanov stardom (1613-89).⁶¹

For the purpose of this analysis it is important to follow the time line and the system of dynastic changes in pre-Petrine period especially during early Rus' and the rise of Muscovy.

The first Russian state emerged in the IX century along the Dnieper river valley. A very important fact is that both the founders and the name 'Russia' had non Slavic origin. The founders were from Riurikid dynasty, successors of the Varangian Riurik the Viking who was the ruler of Novgorod in 860.⁶² The name Russia was as well of Scandinavian origin.

"Russia throughout this period has been identified as that territory which was ruled by the Riurikid grand princes and tsars to 1598."⁶³

During Kievan Rus' all Riurikid princes kept strong 'Norse' ties either by marriage or alliance.

"By the reign of Svyatoslav (r. 945-972) Kievan rulers had adopted Slavic religion and names, but their 'druzhina' still consisted primarily of Scandinavians."⁶⁴

Replacing the Slavic religion with Byzantine Orthodox Christianity, Vladimir the Great at the end of the X century, did not change many things in succeeding Riurikid princes's Scandinavian continuity. Yaroslav the Wise, the founder of the first Rus' Code of Laws

⁶¹ Maureen Perrie (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Russia*, Vol. 1: From Early Rus' to 1689 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), Introduction.

⁶² "Rurik," James R. Millar (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Russian History* (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), p. 1311.

⁶³ Maureen Perrie (ed.), *op. cit.*, Introduction.

⁶⁴ "Kievan Rus'," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kievan_Rus' (Search date: 2007/03/21)

Russkaya Pravda, established his power over his brothers due to Varangians in his services and Scandinavian alliance.

The reasons for converting to Orthodox Christianity were diverse. Olga, Vladimir's grandmother was the first one from Riurikids who converted to Christianity. Many people had accepted Christianity before Vladimir proclaimed it as official religion.

The reason for accepting Christianity, besides tentative for establishing closer ties with Byzantium, may have been similar to the one behind Constantine's *Edict of Milan*. Even though Vladimir tried to establish Slavic god Perun as the supreme god, following Christian monotheistic model, Christianity as socially obedient and tolerant religion was more suitable for the development of stronger society. Later, in the struggles for power Christianity was rendering new credibility to the throne pretenders:

“The election of Michael Romanov by an Assembly of the Land in 1613 restored stability, although the new dynasty still found it necessary to supplement its elective legitimacy by emphasizing continuity with the Riurikids (Michael was the great-nephew of Anastasiia Romanovna, the first wife of Ivan IV), and claiming that the young Romanov tsar was chosen by God.”⁶⁵

Christianity brought a new social cohesion and a feeling of unity between ruling ‘Norse’ elite and majority Slavic population. However, not only the cultural cohesion was established. The formal part of Christianity, the rules, norms, codex, put requirements for more formal, not just customary, canonization of society.

“Yaroslav adopted a law code known as the *Russkaya Pravda*, which with amendments remained in force throughout the Kievan Rus era.”⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Maureen Perrie (ed.), *op. cit.*, Introduction.

⁶⁶ “Kievan Rus,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 752.

Russkaya Pravda was not only the first code of laws, it was also the first legal document which officially indicated several degrees of feudal dependency of peasants,⁶⁷ as a pre-arrangement for the “enslaving of the peasantry and the legal stratification of society.”⁶⁸

“When the Mongols invaded and destroyed Kievan Rus, many members of the Rurikid dynasty were killed in battle. Nevertheless, with the approval of their new overlords, surviving princes continued to rule the lands of Rus.”⁶⁹

Daniil Aleksandrovich due to the support of the Mongol Khans succeeded to establish the continuity of Rurikid in Muscovy. Until the end of Mongol Yoke in 1480, succeeding rulers from Rurikid dynasty had paid their tribute to Mongols through tax collection and thus maintained loyalty. Nevertheless, during the period of expansion, consolidation and the crisis of Muscovy, the struggles for power among Russian ‘Rurikid’ elite intensified.

“Muscovite princes, who efficiently collected the tribute demanded by the Tatar Khans, enhanced their coffers through reward and fraud.”⁷⁰

The new elements influenced by ‘oriental despotism’ started to raise importance of clan-connection. To belong to the Rurikid dynasty was not a sufficient guarantee and not the only requirement for the throne succession, with the declining of Kievan Russia. There were many Rurikid descendants of equal power who were, during Mus-

⁶⁷ “Русская Правда,” <http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/RP/> (Search date:2007/03/15)

⁶⁸ Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998), book review by Richard Hellie, <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/hellie.html> (Search date: 2007/03/16)

⁶⁹ “Rurikid Dynasty,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 1312.

⁷⁰ “Mongol Yoke (1237–1480),” <http://www.britannica.com/ebi/article-207573> (Search date: 2007/03/17)

covy serving Mongol Khans, as vassals. To Rise to the power was possible only by strengthening inner ‘clan connection’ within certain Riurikid’s dynastic branches, and by the increased contiguity with the Khan. This, at that time newly cultural and social category, had been developed as Russian variant of ‘oriental despotism,’ enhanced throughout the time, and later in the XX century in conjugation with nomenklatura system became the most distinctive characteristic of Russian society.

3.2 Richard Hellie’s Service-Class Revolution Theory

According to Richard Hellie,⁷¹ in Russian imperial history, since 1480 there had been three service-class revolutions corresponded to Ivan the Terrible and his *Oprichnina*,⁷² Peter the Great and westernization, Stalin and his Great Purge. Every time Russia faced great external threat it started militarizing and mobilizing the entire society. Fluctuations in the development of Russian state and society were similar to fluctuations of sinus curve with ups representing the periods of service-class emergence, and downs representing the service class degradation and its attempt for self-preservation.

“Each service-class revolution lost its vitality, and degenerated when, in the absence of significant external threats, the Russian/Soviet state coasted along. In those circumstances the service classes’ privileges were not balanced by their value to the state.”⁷³

During Early Rus’ the seed for social stratification had been sown, due to: The different origin of ruling elite; the first code of laws *Russkaya Pravda*, that implemented the rules of peasantry depen-

⁷¹ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–112.

⁷² “Enserfment,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 456.

⁷³ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

dence; the Orthodoxy that was bound by Byzantine Orthodox identity;⁷⁴ the importance of clan connections increased by declining cohesion and the branching of Riurikid dynasty during Mongol Yoke; the Riurikid dynasty reliance on Mongols Khans with the new way of state governing influenced by ‘oriental despotism.’

3.3 The First Service-Class Revolution

The new social disbalance brought by the annexation of Novgorod to Muscovy in 1478, mixed with the external threat that Muscovy had faced from Lithuania, Sweden on the north, Poles on the west and Tatars and Ottomans on the south, triggered the first service-class revolution in the late XVI century.

Pomestie,⁷⁵ the new landholding system initiated in Novgorod created different type of feudal stratification found of newly emerged service-class.

“This initiated the tradition that membership in the service class depended only on service, not social origin or ethnicity.”⁷⁶

However, cavalrymen – landholders who were the core of service class neither represented feudal landlords, nor sub-in-feudal layer of society.

“Even members of the service class had no rights, something that was best expressed in the fact that like their serfs they could be flogged (at least until Article 15 of the Charter of the Nobility forbade it in 1785).”⁷⁷

⁷⁴ “Orthodoxy,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 1120.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1204–1205.

⁷⁶ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

Pomestie was a bit anachronistic, resembling Byzantine *pronoia* and the Persian *ikhta*.⁷⁸ With the serfdom system prevailing until 1906 and feudal system with quasi feudal class meant to be the inner social stabilizer and state's security guarantor, Russia took the unusual path of development. This path later on was heavily burdened by problems of national identity, multi-ethnicity, continuous mismatch and an increasing need for catching up with the western civil society model.

The tradition of *pomestie* non-ethnically based service-class promotion in a long run created a new ruling class, a serious concurrent to the aristocratically originated elite, which hastened, from above, declination of imperial Russia in its latest periods.

“The political economy of the empire was based from its earliest days upon cooptation of high-ranking and powerful local elites into a serving and ruling class. Some of the highest-ranking families in the realm were originally Tatars or Poles; over time, these great landed families became the “Russian” aristocracy. Even in the beginning of the twentieth century, half of the titled members of the State Council came from non-Russian families.”⁷⁹

Serfdom was immanent category of Russia's society starting from Kievan Russia. According to Richard Hellie there are many different possible explanations for the institutionalization of serfdom system in Russia.

“One was the nature of political authority, which will be discussed further in a moment. Another was the fact that Russia had no tradition of human rights to which the oppressed could appeal. A third was the age-old indigenous tra-

⁷⁸ “*Pomestie*,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 1204.

⁷⁹ Jane Burbank, “Rights, Courts, and Citizenship: Law and Belonging in the Russian Empire,” Harvard-Maryland Workshop: “Citizenship, Nationality, and the State in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union,” Davis Center for Russian Studies (Harvard University, March 28, 2004), pp. 7–8.

dition of slavery in which many of the slaves were East Slavs/Russians who sold themselves into slavery.”⁸⁰

The institutionalization of the serfdom had occurred during Ivan IV's (Ivan the Terrible) 'Forbidden Years'⁸¹ at the end of XVI century, and had lasted until 1906. The serfdom system represented social fundament for each service-class revolution. Even the third service-class revolution, 'The Stalin Revolution,' was based on collectivization which had bounded peasants to the collective units, easily controlled by authorities.

Each service-class revolution had been initiated by the great external threat and each had two phases; one progressive – all resources mobilizing 'garrison state' phase; and the other regressive, which coincided with the declination of external threat. All regressive phases in their final stage initiated social reforms with the purpose of abiding service class's privileges.

The regression phase of the first service-class revolution appeared due to the progress achieved in military technology brought by gunpowder revolution:

“The progress of the gunpowder revolution gradually made the bow-and-arrow-shooting middle-service-class provincial cavalry obsolescent as it was replaced by more effective branches of military service. Thanks to their political power, however, the *pomeshchiki* managed to retain control over their serfs.”⁸²

'Garrison state' as a concept closely depends on the pace and intensity of the military state crystallization. Military state crystallization on the other hand, as I showed in the previous chapter, varies

⁸⁰ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁸¹ "Enserfment," James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 456.

⁸² Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

depending on improvement in military technology which can also trigger changes in the concept of war. The changes in the concept of war could revoke the existence of the 'garrison state.' If this happened, if the circle was closed, then the situation could create the impression of the great external threat, hence the justification for the emergence of new service-class revolution. The 'enchanted circle,' when it's socially derived, could be renewed over and over always having as its consequence the raise of garrison state. This deductive pattern matches Russian pre and post service-class revolutions historical 'evolvment.'

By the end of the second phase of the first service-class revolution in XVII century the old boyar elite had strengthened its position through 'cross-clan' connections.

"The boyar elite was not a transitory series of great men but a congeries of clans, some at the pinnacle of society since the fourteen century, and who remained at that pinnacle at least until the end of the eighteenth century."⁸³

The maintenance of their privileges was possible due to the undeveloped and deinstitutionalized state bureaucratic system, which was mostly at that time corrupted and influenced by boyars.

"The turn to corruption probably had something to do with the boyars and other members of the upper service class nominally taking over the command of the bureaucracy beginning in the years after 1613."⁸⁴

Being pressed by these circumstances, Tsar Alexei issued, in 1649, *Ulozhenie* (Law Code) which divided Muscovite society into castes and withhold boyar elite:

⁸³ Paul Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power, 1671-1725* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), Introduction.

⁸⁴ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

“The most viable option in such an uncertain scenario was to promulgate a legal system that created a multifaceted bind for the noble classes, one that gained their obeisance through fear, obligation, and rewards.”⁸⁵

3.4 The Second Service-Class Revolution

A need for institutionalization of the state, thus the development of statehood and formal bureaucratic institutions became urgent after The Thirteen Years' War (1654-1667) which showed obsolescence of bow-and-arrow warfare and dispensable of middle service class.⁸⁶ In the late XVII century the great external threat came from Sweden. Modernization of the state's formal bureaucratic institutions came along with modernization of the army. As for the service class,

“the 1722 Table of Ranks formalized the hierarchy of the new service class and made it clear, as it had been in Muscovy, that social status depended on meritorious service.”⁸⁷

Once again for the promotion in the service class, similar to the first service-class revolution, ethnicity was not important. Peter the Great's foreign minister Pyotr Shafirov was of Jewish origin. In Peter's words:

“I could not care less whether a man is baptized or circumcised, only that he knows his business and he distinguishes himself by probity.”⁸⁸

The First and the second service-class revolutions, as I mentioned before, had promoted some families of non-Russian origin into elites. Family and clan ties, fused with nomenclature system, later will play

⁸⁵ Ian Campbell, “An Autocracy of Consent,” http://www.gmalivuk.com/otherstuff/otherpeople/ian_russian-history.htm (Search date: 2007/03/21)

⁸⁶ “Dvorianstvo,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 420.

⁸⁷ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁸⁸ “Service State,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 1372.

one of the most important roles in consolidation and transition of state's elites in post-Second World War Soviet Russia. Kinship relations were absolutely crucial to the political role of the great families, even the promotion to and within Duma ranks had depended on ancestral position and the complex of informal rules by which such promotions occurred.⁸⁹

On the other hand, the changes that happened in serfdom system during the second service-class revolution bounded peasants to their masters and not to the land. "The serf system differed very little from many systems of slavery."⁹⁰ It worsened a lot the life of peasants. If Peter had stabilized service class with institutionalization of the state and modernization of the army, then stabilization of the straitened peasantry was controlled and was under surveillance by one other institution that also went under reforms during his reign; the Orthodox Church.

3.5 Pre-Form of the Russian Secret Intelligence

As I mentioned Orthodox Church had played very important role in brining social cohesion and common identity in Kievan Russia. During Mongol Yoke it was the most influential, helping people to withstand the difficult years, attuning both nobles and peasants by the great efforts for prevailing peace between the first, and conducting Christianization among the second.

"Church leaders accepted the dual task of converting the populace in the countryside, where Orthodoxy had only slowly spread, and promoting a new political order that would

⁸⁹ Paul Bushkovitch, *op. cit.*, Introduction.

⁹⁰ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

avoid the internecine political squabbles among princes that had led to the Mongol defeat of Russia.”⁹¹

Nevertheless, those actions were possible only due to Mongol’s noninterference and indifference for cultural and religious matters of the conquered states. The dichotomy created at that time between secular and religious authorities’ tendencies was present during all pre-Petrine Russia.

“The secular authorities tended to have an orientation toward the steppe heritage, while the religious authorities tended to have an orientation toward the Byzantine heritage.”⁹²

Russian Orthodox Church declared independence from Byzantium after the Council of Florence-Ferrara (1439–1443), and only in the 1589 did Russian Metropolitan elevate to the rank of Patriarch.⁹³ During the years of Mongol Yoke Russian Orthodox Church was being carried by the idea of becoming the ‘Third Rome’ after Constantinople had fallen.⁹⁴

In the period of Kievan Russia there were many not so successful attempts in attacking Byzantium. This psychological factor coupled with royal marriages between two countries developed accreditation of Byzantium especially of Byzantine Orthodoxy, which in its pure form, unprocessed by the Russian Orthodox Church, was extraneous to the Slavic cultural and religious heritage. To the ‘Norse’ ruling

⁹¹ “Orthodoxy,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 1120.

⁹² Donald Ostrowski, Author’s response: *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), <http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Migration/reviews/ryanresp.html> (Search date: 2007/03/21)

⁹³ “Orthodoxy,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 1120.

⁹⁴ Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), book review by Will Ryan, <http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Migration/reviews/ryan.html> (Search date: 2007/03/21)

elite in Kievan Russia this was of less importance as far as the basic Orthodox Christian codes were bringing better cohesion and obedience of the enserfed Slavic peasantry.

In order to illustrate this better I can make a comparison with Orthodoxy in the early Serbian kingdom. Rastko Nemanjic (Saint Sava), the son of the Serbian ruler and the founder of Serbian medieval state Stefan Nemanja, was the one who established Serbian Orthodox Church as autocephalous body in 1219. Later in 1346, when the King Stefan Dusan took the imperial title of Tsar and conquered most of the Byzantine territories, archbishop of Pech raised to the title of Patriarch.⁹⁵ The Serbian ruling dynasty was of Serbian origin, so were the people who were ruled by that dynasty. Serbian Orthodoxy had its own cultural and ethnical imprint. In the period of Serbian Tsardom and afterward when its power declined, this immanent pattern of Serbian Orthodoxy remained untouched.

The tendency for continuation of the East Roman Empire expressed by Orthodox Church in Muscovy Russia where utilized by the Grand Prince Ivan III whose succession to the throne was approved by the theory of 'divine rights of kings,' which the abbot of the Volokolamsk Monastery Iosif borrowed from the VI century Byzantine deacon and adviser to Justinian I, Aapetos.⁹⁶ After Ivan IV and establishment of Tsardom continuity with Byzantine Orthodoxy declined. The raising importance of the state institutions and Western influence replaced the role and predisposition of the Russian Orthodox Church.

⁹⁵ "Uspon Kraljevstva (1199-1321)," http://www.rodoslovlje.com/medieval_serbia/ser/istorija2.htm (Search date: 2007/03/018)

⁹⁶ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

“Limitations on the power of institutional Orthodoxy increased through the second half of the seventeenth century.”⁹⁷

The decline in the Russian Orthodox Church’s power culminated during Peter the Great reign and the second service-class revolution. Institutional reforms made by creation of the Holy Synod in 1721 effected transformation of both the role and function of the Orthodox Church in the newly established secular society.

“Westernized system of government implemented by Peter I (“the Great”) and his successors meant that secular Russian society lived side-by-side with traditional Orthodox culture.”⁹⁸

However, this coexistence was not quite symbiotic. Church became an institution in the service of the state. With institutionalization and westernalization of the state Peter also started reforming economy.

“As tsar he wanted to apply western mercantilism to stimulate agriculture, industry and commerce. A richer Russia could only benefit the position of the tsar as more could be taxed and invested into the military. A further strengthened military would further enhance his power. In fact, Peter achieved less than he would have liked to but he did kick start the economic growth of Russia that was witnessed in the Eighteenth Century.”⁹⁹

Even though reforms were made for the purpose of supporting the garrison state, the transformation of economy created working class. Century’s old social system founded on serfs, service class members, and dynastic aristocracy, received one more component which became an element of instability and a real challenge to the imperial

⁹⁷ “Orthodoxy,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 1120.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ “Peter the Great - Domestic Reforms,” http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/peter_the_great2.htm (Search date: 2007/03/018)

Russia. In these circumstances Peter's Russia, already militarized by the second service-class revolution and with the service class prepared to respond to external threat, started showing a need for the inner state surveillance system.

“The Petrine clergy were also state servitors who, among other things, were obliged to report to the state anything that sounded subversive heard in a confession or elsewhere.”¹⁰⁰

In regressive phase of the second-service revolution the threat within the state started shaking and destabilizing the entire society. Alexandrine Reforms of 1861 – 1874 which tried to loosen up the social tension created by growing working class and the immense difficulties of raising multi-ethnicity, finished with his assassination in 1881. The assassination and the growing inner state threat immediately triggered the creation of institutionalized apparatus for surveillance, the secret police force of the Russian Empire *Okhrana*.

At the same time the Orthodox Church as a previously unofficially surveillance apparatus joined this effort straightening its policies by adopting conservative doctrine of Procurator of the Holy Synod, Kostantin Pobedonostsev.

“Pobedonostsev was considered one of the “most baleful influences on the reign” of Nicholas II and the ultra-conservative and reactionary force behind many of Alexander III's and Nicholas II's manifestos.”¹⁰¹

He set the policies of conversion of non-Orthodox and russification. They were opposite to the centuries lasting ethnical tolerance and coexistence immanent to the Russian service-class state.

¹⁰⁰ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

¹⁰¹ “Pobedonostsev, Konstantin,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 1188.

“These and other reactionary policies radically alienated Jews, Caucasians, Poles, Finns, Tatars, and others and accelerated the downfall of the Russian Empire.”¹⁰²

3.6 The Third Service-Class Revolution and the Transformation of Secret Intelligences

The third service-class revolution according to Richard Hellie occurred during ‘the Soviet war scare of 1926-1927.’¹⁰³ The great external threat from England, France, and The United States in this case was also induced by the fact that those countries had already interfered in the Russian Civil War. However, this might not have been the real cause for the third service-class revolution because:

“Forced draft buildup of the military did not yield as much as might have been anticipated after the war scare of 1927, but seems to have been a factor in the election of Hitler — to which the Soviets themselves contributed significantly in other ways as well.”¹⁰⁴

An external threat has always been present starting from the beginning of Russian Civil War in 1919. Therefore, the question is why the third service-class revolution happened later in the middle 1920s, and more important, was its occurrence along with theoretical framework given for the previous service-class revolutions. Pre-October Revolution changes in the legal system made for the purpose of more ‘liberal’ reform at the township level showed that peasantry was quite an inert component of the society, and that

¹⁰² Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹⁰³ John P. Sontag, “The Soviet War Scare of 1926-27,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan. 1975), pp. 66–77.

¹⁰⁴ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

“Liberation of the peasantry from its burdensome guardianship, peasants with reason might have seen the same reform as vastly increasing the number of their guardians.”¹⁰⁵

Peasantry/Serfs was the factor of stability for the previous service classes’ garrison state and they have remained to be even after 1917, which was in some sense a breaking point from the centuries old social system. The inertness of the peasantry was used through collectivization as a support for industrialization, and one more time as bedrock for the new service-class revolution.

As the new social system diverged from the social system of pre-Petrine and imperial Russia, so did the hierarchical categorization within the new service class. Thus, the hierarchical primacy was different and new in comparison to the previous service-class revolutions.

“The definition of the service class also expanded from elite military and governmental figures to factory directors, important scientists, and even leading writers, musicians, and artists.”¹⁰⁶

In the cases of the previous service-class revolutions the ethnicity was not an obstacle to the promotion in the service class; nevertheless, the position of minorities was never quite easy. Indeed, regarding the Jews; even if they had been tolerated for some period of time their position started worsening after “the Russian Empire acquired the Jewish population through the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. By 1800 Russia’s Jewish population numbered more than 800.000 persons.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Jane Burbank, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁰⁶ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

¹⁰⁷ “Jews,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 701–705.

“Pale of Settlement”¹⁰⁸ created by Catherine the Great in 1791 limited the movement of Jews. Later, during Alexander’s II reforms which repressed minorities, the situation for Jewish population became very adverse, especially after they had been accused for his assassination.

“The anti-Jewish riots (pogroms) of 1881 and 1882 led to a reversal of this policy, inspiring efforts to segregate Jews from non-Jews through residence restrictions (the May Laws of 1882) and restricted access to secondary and higher education.”¹⁰⁹

Conservative doctrine of Procurator of the Holy Synod, Kostantin Pobedonostsev that influenced Alexander III, deteriorated the position of all minorities even more. The Jews started being involved in revolutionary movements:

“The presence of the Jews in the revolutionary movement led the state to attribute political disloyalty to Jews in general.”¹¹⁰

During February 1917, in the first stage of the October Revolution which resulted in the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, military troops had already been politicized due to the difficult conditions caused by the First World War and the mass revolt and dissatisfaction with Tsar’s autocracy. Many law ranking officers as the representatives of socially segregated part of the service class joined the mass revolt. The October Revolution broke centuries old social framework. Military structure along with the whole society faced organizational chaos. Antirevolutionary elements within society threatened to destabilize Bolshevik governance. All this caused the formation of state

¹⁰⁸ Alden Oreck, “The Pale of Settlement,” <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/pale.html> (Search date: 2007/03/019)

¹⁰⁹ “Jews,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 701–705.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

security organization *Cheka* led by Felix Dzerzhinsky in December 1917. The same type of organization that had pursued anti-Imperial and revolutionary movements within imperial Russian since Tsar Nicholas I and his secret police *The Third Section of Imperial Chancellery*, had been used by Bolshevik. The purpose of this organization resembled the purpose of imperial secret police; persuading anti-regime elements. Even though the previous social frame had been broken, its basic way of functioning became an immanent and indissoluble part of common Russian concessions.

The great external threat always resulted in Russia's service-class revolution. Yet, the great social instability resulted in high inner state surveillance. In the periods of undeveloped state institutions this function was performed by Orthodox Church, representing rudiment of secret intelligence; later on by imperial secret police.

The factor of inner threat was decisive for the initiation of the third service-class revolution. In the cases of the previous service-class revolutions this element was mostly bound by traditional and firm social fundamentals. However, in the case of the third service-class revolution the emerging society represented ideologically, structurally and in many other ways discontinuation with the previous social system. There was a social cohesion which had previously been embodied due to tradition of the same social layering, after the October Revolution had disappeared. Nothing within newly emerged social system could be used for controlling inner social threat and instability. This was one of the reasons for the promptness, in which *Cheka* was established. In some sense it represented the continuity of the pre-October Revolution Russian military crystallization. This can reflect influence which secret intelligence as a part of military crys-

tallization had on transformation of Bolshevik Russia's state structures. The other reason was the nonexistence of elite transition. The royal family was killed, and the other part of 'dynastic' aristocracy removed from political arena. The power of service class as elite pretendant or eventual representative declined with increase in the number of non-noble officers starting from the end of XIX century.

The October Revolution created new social circumstances. The third service-class revolution was more repercussion of inner social instability than of the respond to an external threat. At this point it differs from the previous two service-class revolutions. Even though the representatives of the service class were diverse, its hierarchically highest levels were not crystallized. New communist ideology attempted to bring ethnical harmonization which had been absent in the last days of imperial Russia. However, the struggle for power among elite pretendants strengthened both ethnical and cross-clan connections. Most of the leaders of the October Revolution were of Jewish origin: Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, etc. The overall representation of the Jews in the ruling Soviet elite of mid 1920s was not big:

“If we take all three sectors of the administration, it emerges that of the 417 people who constituted the ruling elite of the Soviet Union in the mid 1920s (the members of the Central Executive Committee, the Party Central Committee, the Presidium of the Executive of the Soviets of the USSR and the Russian Republic, the Ministers, and the Chairman of the Executive Committee), twenty-seven (that is 6%) were Jews.”¹¹¹

However, they held the most important positions. The breaking point which triggered the third service-class revolution was Lenin's

¹¹¹ Benjamin Pinkus, *The Jews of the Soviet Union: The History of a National Minority* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988), p. 83.

death in 1924. In his testament Lenin had criticized the members of Soviet leadership Joseph Stalin, Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin and Leon Trotsky. It seemed that the less favorable candidate was Stalin because:

“Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution;

Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealing among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I suggest the comrades think about a way of removing Staling from that post and appointing another man in his stead.”¹¹²

Stalin, once a member of Tsarist secret police *Okhrana*,¹¹³ started using Soviet secret police OGPU against Trotsky and Trotskyist. Mass social repression created by ‘corrective labor camps’ in the early years of Bolshevik Russia, and later after 1929 with Gulags, put the secret police on the pedestal of the elite self-confirmation. Especially, after NKVD succeeded OGPU,

“fear of Trotsky’s secret penetration immobilized Soviet Intelligence operations in the late 1930s. The NKVD, Stalin’s secret police, heightened vigilance to ensure loyalty to Stalin not to Trotsky. Intelligence officers and agents were recalled to Moscow for vetting, where hundreds were executed or sent to labor camps.”¹¹⁴

If Stalin had some anti-Semitic sentiments they “surely originated from the long years of struggle with Trotsky and his supporters. What

¹¹² “Lenin’s Testament (1922),” <http://www.historyguide.org/europe/testament.html> (Search date: 2007/03/19)

¹¹³ “The Eremin Letter,” <http://www.ericlee.info/stalin.htm> (Search date: 2007/03/19)

¹¹⁴ Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, *op. cit.*, prologue xxxi.

was originally political hate gradually became a feeling of racial hatred against all Jews, without exception.”¹¹⁵

The struggle for power set dichotomy within cross-clan connections, putting ethnicity as one of the discrepancy factors. Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria the most influential chief of NKVD was of Georgian origin. However, sometimes in literature ethnical connections were emphasized too much. Stalin, during his anti-Trotskyist purge, was led less by ethnical origin and more by his paranoia. Even Beria himself was a victim of his paranoia in early 1950s.¹¹⁶ If he purged most of the Jewish originated leading politicians like Zionev, Kamenev, or chief of NKVD Yagoda, on the other hand, he had very loyal Jewish associated like Lazar Kaganovich whose sister Stalin was secretly married with. The reason Stalin was recalling intelligence’s agents in the late 1930s was influenced by their origin, because most of Soviet secret intelligence’s agents acting abroad were of Jewish origin. However, their Jewish origin was actually the essence and base of Soviet secret intelligence’s covert operation and spying activities during 1930s and 1940s. Almost all people involved on both sides in the biggest Soviet secret intelligence’s operations in US before and during the Second World War, like ‘VENONA project’ or ‘Operation Snow’¹¹⁷ had Jewish origin. Stalin was exploiting unfavorable positions of the Jews in that period. He achieved his goals in stealing US military and civilian technology only thanks to the concern of the important Jewish originated people in US and their attempt to help the struggle against Fascists.

¹¹⁵ “How Stalin, the ‘breaker of nations,’ hated, murdered Jews,” *The Washington Times*, <http://washingtontimes.com/books/20030816-105043-6895r.htm> (Search date: 2007/03/20)

¹¹⁶ “Beria, Lavrenti Pavlovich,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹¹⁷ Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–158.

Nevertheless, this was a double edged sword. From 1949 until his death, Stalin conducted anti-Semitic purge. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAFC), organized in March 1942 in Moscow with Stalin's full approval, was dissolved in 1948. The reason for its dissolution was Stalin's fear of "establishment a Jewish republic in the Crimea as a 'bridgehead' for American imperialism."¹¹⁸

During and after the Great Purge in 1930s, NKVD (headed by Yagoda 1934 – 1936; Yezhov 1936 – 1938; and Beria 1938 – 1946) played the leading role in spreading prosecutions, executions, terror, establishing itself as the most important state institution; 'Stalin's right hand.' In those years the crystallization and consolidation of elite started around nucleus that represented Stalin himself and his secret police. After

“‘The Stalin Revolution,’ its role changed completely from a political body to a personnel organization, the equivalent in the 1930s and later of the Military Chancellery (Razriad) in the seventeenth century. It controlled the notorious *nomenklatura*, the ranking and assignment of the top 40,000 positions and individuals in the Soviet Union. With the most rare exceptions, one could not get a very good position in life without being a member of the Communist Party simply because the Party controlled all the good ones.”¹¹⁹

In the previous chapters I mentioned that within military crystallization emerged the institution of secret intelligence due to the changes in the concept of war and technological breakthroughs, created by the first and second industrial revolution. Its function was subordinated to the military purposes, representing military subsection. The development of Soviet secret police after the October Revolution and during the following two decades, changed the entire con-

¹¹⁸ “How Stalin, the ‘breaker of nations,’ hated, murdered Jews,” *op. cit.*

¹¹⁹ Richard Hellie, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

cept of secret intelligence, shifting military crystallization of the state based on previous concept of war, into a new direction. Created for the purposes of managing and resolving the inner state threat, yet, used as a main tool in struggle for power by elite pretendants, Soviet secret intelligence evolved, or maybe is better to say mutated, from the subsection of military crystallization into military crystallization with the subsection of previous ‘traditional’ military crystallization. The shift from the covert collection of information towards covert operations, and institutional transformation of inner surveillance purposes institution toward state and social stabilizer, changed functions, strategy, tactics, purposes and finally the concept of the Soviet secret intelligence. Its direct involvement in covert operations and spying in US before and during the Second World War,¹²⁰ and after on a global scale during entire Cold War period was a cause for American reciprocal response in the formation of CIA and US Intelligence Community, which together with KGB have represented ‘the new generation’ secret intelligence. The state which previously hardly corresponded to the western civil society model became a part of it by imposing within it the new type of military crystallization – something very specific, determined by centuries old Russian social idiosyncrasy.

¹²⁰ Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–158.

Chapter IV. Russian Secret Intelligence and the Post-WWII Soviet Nomenklatura Structure

Nomenklatura system in the post-Second World War Soviet Union represented the state structure spine. At the same time, it was the main principle that determined national elite. Nomenklatura positions had been divided into 14 ranks, as early as the Stalin era.¹²¹ Nomenklatura system and the system of privileges it implied created another social reality. This reinforcement of elements inherited, or at least similar to the old social division enabled by the imposed serfdom system, was good foundation for the hierarchical stratification of society.

¹²¹ At the highest level was the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, followed by members of the Politburo, candidate Politburo members and the Central Committee Secretaries. The next rank in the hierarchy consisted of the nomenklatura of the Politburo - that is, the list of positions to which appointments were made or approved at Politburo level. This list included the first and (sometimes) second secretaries of republican party organizations, the first secretaries of regional party committees and of the largest towns, all-union ministers, the military hierarchy, ambassadors to all the socialist countries and to the largest capitalist countries, directors of the largest military-industrial enterprises, the leading officials of the creative unions, and the editors of central newspapers and journals. The level below this was the nomenklatura of the Central Committee Secretariat, including a more junior list of positions: deputy ministers, the second secretaries of regional party committees, the heads of regional soviet executives, and so forth. Then came positions that required the approval of the relevant Central Committee department, and after it positions that required the approval of regional, urban and district party committees, and even (at the lowest level) of local party branches. The hierarchical principle required a steady progression through these stages, from level to level: it was similar in many ways to an army hierarchy, and (as in the armed forces) exceptions were rare.

Olga Kryzhtanovskaya and Stephen White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 5 (July 1996), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n5_v48/ai_18678005 (Search date: 2007/03/21)

“Nomenklatura,.....another, entirely different, and special country from which ordinary citizens were carefully isolated.”¹²²

Correspondingly with nomenklatura system there was one more system, one more defining structure. Secret intelligence, after Stalin death still prevailed as the most influential factor for the Soviet state crystallization. It shared nomenklatura designated social privileges. Yet, it has always been a sense autonomous with momentous influence on nomenklatura system and its apex as well as on the state itself.

Even if the power of secret intelligence declined in the first decade after Stalin’s death (after Khrushchev outmaneuvered Beria in a bitter power struggle),¹²³ it was quickly reestablished with succeeding KGB Chairmen Ivan Serov and Alexander Shelepin. The first one was replaced by Khrushchev’s order because of the defections of KGB during his chairmanship. The second one, together with his handpicking successor Vladimir Semichastny, was the most important player in the coup against Khrushchev in October 1964.¹²⁴ Even if the members of nomenklatura structure and secret intelligence had the same position in the social hierarchy, in terms of pretension for becoming the leading political elite, they were opponents. The strengthening of nomenklatura system after the third service-class revolution and Stalin’s death delineated the beginning of the second regressive phase, commencement of declination and decadency of the service class.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ “Beria, Lavrenti Pavlovich,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1472–1473.

During the chairmanship of Serov, Shelepin and Semichastny in KGB, in revert to pre-declining time of Stalin's era, the power of secret intelligence structure was gradually increased. However, the true reestablishment of its power and political elite primacy took place after 1967, with Yuri Andropov as the head of KGB. On the other hand, nomenklatura structure during Brezhnev faced further regression with the first generation of nomenklatura members' family heirs reached working age.

Within nomenklatura structure, the system of promotion was gradual, moving from hierarchically lower position to the higher ones; exceptions were rare. For nomenklatura members' family heirs there was informal convention:

“The children of higher-level officials never inherited positions with the same level of seniority as their fathers. Rather, ‘elite children’ had a series of special professional niches, often connected with work abroad. This was supported by a special system of nomenklatura education at elite institutions, particularly those that trained economists, diplomats and journalists specializing in international affairs.”¹²⁵

Thus, nomenklatura structure's first generation of family heirs were in position through their education and specific jobs to get in touch with the West more often than other social groups. Even though they were not, according to nomenklatura informal convention, directly incorporated into nomenklatura system, still they created through their education and specific professional careers new opportunities for obtaining and prevailing nomenklatura structure's power and privileges in the later periods of state and social transformations.

¹²⁵ Olga Kryshanovskaya and Stephen White, *op. cit.*

“Under the Soviet regime, family and friendship connections were one of the main criteria for co-optation at all levels of the CPSU (Communist Party) hierarchy.”¹²⁶

During Brezhnev period, corruption increased significantly at all hierarchical levels of nomenklatura structure and state bureaucracy.

“By 1982, the reach of Soviet power was greater, and Brezhnev's leadership had become stultifyingly passive; there can have been few nations that did not recognize the impact a new leader in the Kremlin could have on the world as well as his own country.”¹²⁷

4.1 Commencement of the Fourth Service-Class Revolution

Leonid Brezhnev was succeeded within 54 hours by Yuri Andropov. It was the first time in history of the Soviet Union, and the modern state, that the head of secret intelligence became the president of the state. During the fifteen year period of his chairmanship in KGB, Andropov strengthened and reestablished the power or secret intelligence structure. However, his real power and the power of secret intelligence before Brezhnev death were not so obvious to the broader international audience. Before Brezhnev's death more drama had been foreseen in the struggle over succession than actually occurred.¹²⁸

In November 1982 Andropov was elected as a general secretary of CPSU, and in June 1983 he was elected a chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet — the head of the state. Just few months earlier, in March 1983, SDI was proposed by R. Regan. This

¹²⁶ Virginie Coulloudon, “Elite Groups in Russia,” *Democratizatsiya*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer 1998), p. 537.

¹²⁷ John M. Burns, “The Emergence of Yuri Andropov,” *The New York Times*, Nov. 6, 1983.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

event was interpreted later as the major cause for disintegration of the Soviet Union. The period of détente caused substantial regression and sluggishness of nomenklatura structure. As the representative of service class of the third service-class revolution in the period of détente nomenklatura structure tried to retain and secure privileges giving the boost for raising corruption. In 1983 a raising external threat created by SDI, and inner instability caused by corrupted nomenklatura structure and the state bureaucracy, were an alarm for Russian fourth service-class revolution.

Andropov straitened discipline within society, exp – “an effort to enforced worker discipline, punishing workers who did not report for duty on time or were drinking on the job;” and cracked down on corruption at higher levels, for exp. – “two members of the Central Committee who were close associates of Brezhnev.”¹²⁹ He understood the necessity of economic transformations and applied limited decentralization in economy. Nevertheless, his reforms were cautious, and detained by his health problems.

Triggering the fourth service revolution and raising the new garrison state which could respond to the external threat and inner state instability was not possible at that time. Planned Economy based on heavy industry kept the state in chronic shortages, with relative unproductive agriculture sector and undeveloped consumer sector. Since 1955 the Soviet Union GDP has been declining, with exception of period 1970-1975.

If the serfdom system was economic bedrock for the first two service-class revolutions, and collectivization and industrialization under plan economy for the third, then in order to conduct the fourth ser-

¹²⁹ “Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 62.

vice-class revolution it was necessary to imply ‘up-to-date’ transformation of economy without drastic social implication. Economically reformed state should continue with the similar pattern of state structuralization as before; around the state structures’ nucleus. The only problem was that there were two nucleuses, almost equally dominated structures after Stalin’s death. Since then, one (nomenklatura) faced decadency and increasing corruption; yet, the other (secret intelligence) was overtaken by rigidity of its procedures and methods in effort to reestablish its lost primacy.

4.2 Russian Secret Intelligence and the Beginning of the State Structures’ Transformation

During 1980s, those two structures became even more confronted over political and economic transformation of the state. Alarmed in the early 1980s by an increased external threat, especially after Andropov’s death, secret intelligence structure sought solution in tightening up and constraining both state and society; hoping that garrison state would respond to the external and internal challenges adequately as it had done before during Stalin’s era. On the other hand, nomenklatura structure adjusted and prepared for transition to eventual new political and economic transformation of the state.

“Over the Brezhnev period a number of typical nomenklatura career patterns developed, all of them under Central Committee auspices: party-economic, Komsomol-party, soviet-party, and party-diplomatic.”¹³⁰

‘Komsomol economy’ developed in late 1980s under Komsomol’s Youth Centers for Scientific and Technical Creation (NTTM), played one of the most important role in the economic transformation

¹³⁰ Olga Kryshnanovskaya and Stephen White, *op. cit.*

of the state. Some of its members like Konstantin Borovoi, Igor Safaryan, Mikhail Khodorkovsky later became the biggest Russian entrepreneurs.

Still, earlier corruption spread within nomenklatura structure increased farther during 1980s. The previous differentiation of career patterns during Brezhnev period, and later boost of some nomenklatura structure's segments, set up the clan connection as the number one factor for the post-Soviet nomenklatura restructuring and later privatization of the state by the state. The prevailed corruptive and outlawed activities within Komsomol in the time of economic transformations was criticized by Gorbachev "addressing the 21st Komsomol Congress in April 1990, warned that it was not the appropriate for the party's youth movement to become involved in 'middleman activity' of this kind."¹³¹

Both structures during 1980s moved towards extreme points and measures: for self-preservation, in the case of nomenklatura structure, and state-preservation, in the case of secret intelligence structure. Collision was unavoidable, and it happened during August Coup in 1991, led by 'Gang of Eight' whose member was the head of KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov. The Coup failure removed hard liners within secret intelligence service. Soon after, KGB was transformed into Federal Security Service – FSB. During Boris Yeltsin's presidency the old nomenklatura structure remained its power through high representation within main political structures:

"A survey conducted in 1994 by the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology that shows that the old nomenklatura represents 75 percent of Yeltsin's closest political allies, 60 percent of the parliament, 74 percent of the govern-

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

ment, 41 percent of the businessmen, and 83 percent of the regional leaders.”¹³²

Nevertheless, secret intelligence structure preserved its power, through proximity to the President. Especially in the years during and after Coup d'état of 21st September 1993,¹³³ and presidential election in 1996 his dependence on secret intelligence structure elevated. The key figure during that time was Alexander Vasilyevich Korzhakov, KGB general, Yeltsin's bodyguard and from 1991 the chief of Presidential Security Service, which he later turned into “what Yeltsin called his personal ‘mini-KGB.’”¹³⁴ According to his biography published in 1997, Korzhakov confessed that he and the FSB chief Mikhail Barsukov, another member of Yeltsin's guard, “governed the country for three years.”¹³⁵

The disparity between nomenklatura and secret intelligence structure became smaller during the mid-1990s when the power of business clans and tycoons increased significantly. However, a widely spread belief at that time was that the leading elite position and main political power would be decided in the struggle between nomenklatura structure and the new business elite.

“The presidential administration and the regional elite tended to emerge from former structures of government; the business

¹³² Virginie Coulloudon, *op. cit.*, p. 536.

¹³³ The constitutional framework for Russian federalism was largely imposed by President Boris Yeltsin after the previous political rules of the game were abruptly terminated in October 1993 as a consequence the violent confrontation between Yeltsin and his opponents in the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD). Control over the army, police, and secret police obviously was fundamental to Yeltsin's victory in this showdown.

Brian D. Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), pp. 282–301.

¹³⁴ “Korzhakov, Alexander Vasilievich,” James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 776.

¹³⁵ Alexander Korzhakov, “Boris Yeltsin: Ot Rasveta Do Zakata,” *Interbuk* (1997), review by Vladimir Shlapentokh, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2066.html> (Search date: 2007/03/21)

elite was more likely to have a background in the Komso-
mol.”¹³⁶

The power of the secret intelligence structure was hidden and not so obvious, similarly to the period when Yuri Andropov succeeded Brezhnev. Moreover, it was believed that FSB represented a pale image of KGB, although its efficiency was very high.¹³⁷

If the family and friendship relations were predominant within The Soviet Union’s elite structures, then later after the formation of Russian Federation they lost importance and were substituted by clan and cross-clan connections. The situation in Russian Federation in 1990s resembled situation in Muscovy Russia during Mongol Yoke. The heritage of that time influenced by ‘oriental despotism’ had repercussion in the period of Russian transition. Basically the reason for the reemergence of the clans had economical as much as political forgoes.

“In the last years of the Soviet regime, the only institutions that had capital in hand were the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Komsomol (Communist youth organization), and the KGB.”¹³⁸

In the 1990s during the period of privatization and economic transformation this financial buttresses from the communist period were the lines around which the clans started to crystallized.

According to Virginie Coulloudon, the formation of the clans was determined by three levels of connections: Federal, sector-related,

¹³⁶ Olga Kryshstanovskaya and Stephen White, *op. cit.*

¹³⁷ Nikolay Kovalev (head of FSB 1996-1998) stated in 1996: “There has never been such a number of spies arrested by us since the time when German agents were sent in during the years of the Second World War;” “Counterintelligence Cases,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/rusia/fsb-cases.htm> (Search date: 2007/03/20)

¹³⁸ Virginie Coulloudon, *op. cit.*, p. 538.

and micro.¹³⁹ Mould of the clans was waste. They were politically, and socially flexible, therefore cross-clan connections were possible. At the federal level the most powerful clans were Chernomyrdin's, Chubais's and Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's. In the financial sector many mighty tycoons emerged as well: Vladimir Potanin (Oneksim Bank), Vladimir Gusinsky (Most Bank), Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Menatep Bank, Yukos), Vladimir Vinogradov (Inkombank), Boris Berezovsky, etc.¹⁴⁰

Due to their financial power and the cross-clan connections, at the time, business elite gained political power. The great financial power of the business elite raised their political credibility through the ownership of media and strategically important sectors. Complicated cross-clan and cross-structures interactions entangled three elite structures in mutually dependant network. In his biography Alexander Korzhakov stated that "he played a major role in recruiting Boris Berezovsky and other rich businessmen to support Yeltsin financially and through their media. Thus he helped turn them into oligarchs with political clout."¹⁴¹

The more the President and nomenklatura structure depended in terms of financial and media support on the members of business elite, the more they became closer and more fastened to the secret intelligence structure. The war and instability in Chechnya made this tie even stronger. After the presidential election Yeltsin turned more to the secret intelligence structure, especially after September 1997.

"On September 15, 1997, Yeltsin summoned the six most prominent Russian financial leaders and made it clear to them

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 537.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 539.

¹⁴¹ "Korzhakov, Alexander Vasilievich," James R. Millar (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 776.

that he wanted to return the control of the economy to the government.”¹⁴²

Two months later in November 1997, Berezovsky resigned from the position of Deputy Secretary, Security Council of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, Yeltsin appointed Yevgeny Primakov, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) from 1991 – 1996, as Foreign Minister 1996 – 1998 and afterward from 1998 – 1999 as the Prime Minister.

After firing Primakov in May 1999, Yeltsin appointed as the Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, who was the head of FSB from February 1994 - June 1995. He was on this position only until August 1999, when he was replaced by Vladimir Putin, a member of KGB since 1975 and the head of FSB from July 1998 - August 1999. Later, as the Prime Minister Putin succeeded Yeltsin in accordance with Russian Constitution after he resigned in December 1999.

¹⁴² The invited bankers were Potanin (OnexsimBank), Mikhail Fridman (Alfa bank), Aleksandr Smolensky (SBS-Agro), Vladimir Gusinsky (Most, Media Most), Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Menatep, Yukos-Rosprom), and Vladimir Vinogradov (Inkombank). Boris Berezovsky was not invited. Some observers have suggested that the anti-Chubais media campaign launched a few weeks later was connected to the fact that the first deputy Prime Minister (and then still Finance minister) wanted to force the industrial holdings to pay their debts to the federal budget. *Izvestia*, September 16, 1997; *Kommersant Weekly*, September 23, 1997.

Chapter V. Empirical Evaluation of the Hypothesis

Under Putin old nomenklatura structure interfused with secret intelligence structure, losing its distinguishing qualities. After 1999 the distinctions between those two were not noticeable any more. Secret intelligence structure took over all major key positions in the state governing structures and farther spread through all the sectors of the state.

Collectively termed the *siloviki* — i.e., individuals with backgrounds in the dozen or so ‘power agencies,’ such as the Federal Security Service [FSB], Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], and Ministry of Defense.¹⁴³

According to Olga Kryshтанovskaya and Stephen White, both military and security representatives made the 25 percent of the whole Russian political elite in 2003.¹⁴⁴ If I compare the periods of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin presidency I can notice steady increase in the proportion of military and security men in the political elite:

¹⁴³ Even though term *siloviki* stands both for secret service and armed forces, predominance based on firmer structuring and clannishness of the first ones was always present in Soviet Union and later in Russian Federation for the reason: socialization inside the KGB was in some ways quite different from that in the armed forces – Soviet era spies were highly educated and often more broad-minded; unlike most segments of Soviet society, they had access to the West.

Sharon W. Rivera and David W. Rivera, “The Russian Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois?” *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April-June 2006), pp. 125–144.

The agent networks, specific channels for data exchange, manipulation channels - these skills make officers who had either worked or are working with the KGB/FSB a special caste, in which the spirit of mutual assistance reigns. This kind of power is steadier, especially since the ideology of patriotism, partially diluted by liberal economic ideas, fastens it.

Olga Kryshтанovskaya, “Putin’s People: Does our future include a militarized Russia and authoritarian rule,” <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7245-1.cfm> (Search date: 2007/03/19)

¹⁴⁴ Olga Kryshтанovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2003), pp. 289–306.

1988 (Gorbachev)	4 percent
1993 (early Yeltsin)	11 percent
1999 (late Yeltsin)	17 percent
2003 (Putin)	25 percent

Proportion of military and security men in the political elite: during Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin.

Source¹⁴⁵

Although the increase in the proportion of *siloviki* was steady, the highest upraise happened in the transition between the presidents. Increase in 7 percent between Gorbachev and early Yeltsin confirms that secret intelligence structure significantly started raising its power and influence during Yeltsin presidency in the early transition stage of Russian Federation.

An increase of 25 percent in the proportion of military and security men during Putin took place in all government sectors of the state:

State Duma	9 percent
regional elite	10 percent
Federation Council	15 percent
federal government	33 percent
Security Council	58 percent

Proportion of military and security men in the political elite: in different government sectors of the state.

Source¹⁴⁶

Regarding this, Kryshtanovskaya and White infer:

“If it was only a few generals who had moved into politics there would be no reason to attach a larger significance to their recruitment. But what has been taking place is not a small number of individual movements, but a wholesale migration that now accounts for 15 to 70 percent of the membership of a variety of elite groups.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 293, 303.

Indeed, the significance increase of *siloviki* was even greater with Putin's restoration of 'power vertical' which regained central control over state coercion:

“One week after taking his presidential oath in May 2000 Putin announced a major reform of Russian federalism. He decreed the creation of seven ‘federal districts (okrugs)’ headed by a ‘presidential representative.’”¹⁴⁸

High – level appointments of *siloviki* in five of the seven federal districts, and their high representation among all federal districts' personnel, circumscribed autonomy of regional governors and the cozy relations between the law enforcement and governors developed under Yeltsin (see table 1). With 'centralizing dictatorship' founded on extended *siloviki* structure throughout federal districts' governing structures, stability within regions was strictly controlled.

Yeltsin's intention, announced in September 1997, to return the control of the economy to the government, was realized by Putin in a very decisive way.

“In principle, a crackdown on oligarchs can be seen as long overdue, a quest for justice. After all, most if not all of the oligarchs acquired the bulk of their wealth through sweetheart deals with the government.”¹⁴⁹

Boris Beresovzky and Vladimir Gusinsky, the two biggest media magnates are both in exile. Mikhail Khodorovsky the chief executive of Yukos was arrested in 2005. Most of the pursuits on oligarchs

¹⁴⁸ Brian D. Taylor, “Force and Federalism: Controlling Coercion in Federal Hybrid Regimes.” Presented at the conference “Postcommunist State and Society: Transnational and National Politics.” Moynihan Institute, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Sep/Oct 2005.

¹⁴⁹ “Open Season on Russia's Oligarchs: Is Putin behind the drive to rein in the business elite,” *Business Week* (July 10, 2000), http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_28/b3689158.htm (Search date: 2007/03/17)

were closely related to the control over Gazprom,¹⁵⁰ strategically the most important Russian company, and to the control over media. Viktor Chernomyrdin, previously mentioned as the arch of one of the most powerful federal level clans related to nomenklatura structure, was, in 2000, replaced from the position of Gazprom the chief executive by Dmitry Medvedev, close aide to President Vladimir Putin. In 2001, Chernomyrdin was appointed an ambassador in Ukraine, hence distanced from the centre of Russian politics. The other two arches of federal level clans Yuriy Luzhkov and Anatoly Chubais affirmed loyalty to President Putin and his reforms. Luzhkov and his party accepted integration with pro-Putin Unity party into single party United Russia, and supported Putin in the 2000 presidential elections. Chubais one of the co-leaders of The Union of Right Forces (SPS) – democratic opposition party, after his party 2003 failure to pass the five percent vote threshold to enter parliament, and especially after Khodorovsky's arrest, affirmed loyalty to Putin.

“In a further demonstration of loyalty to the Kremlin, Chubais said that UES would sell REN-TV, the only Russian television channel beyond Kremlin control.”¹⁵¹

With 35 percent of all deputy ministers and department heads appointed from 2000 to 2003, having a military of security background, high – level appointments of *siloviki* in five of the seven federal districts, disciplined parliament, raised personal popularity, the business magnates frightened by arrests or exile of several of their

¹⁵⁰ The largest Russian (state owned) company, the biggest extractor of natural gas in the world and today regarding oil reserves the third ranked behind Saudi Arabia and Iran.

¹⁵¹ “Leading Russian Liberal Chubais Affirms Loyalty to Putin,” *Mosnews* (June 06, 2005), <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/06/10/chubaisloyal.shtml> (Search date: 2007/03/019)

number, national television subservient, and the policy process almost totally closed¹⁵² Putin was sought as 'reanimated Andropov;' the one who could consolidate society, restore public order, and strengthen state power, which had grown weak and fragmented under Yeltsin.

The fourth service-class revolution almost emerged during Andropov. As I mentioned all factors were present and confirmative with its triggering: a great external threat raised by SDI after 20 years of détente, inner state and social instability was caused by law performing economy and corruption within nomenklatura structure. However, at that time, it was not possible to carry out the new service revolution for several reasons.

First, the secret intelligence structure, although with the most powerful head since Stalin's era, was not strong enough to carry out and coordinate the new service-class revolution. As I showed in 1980s it did not penetrate nomenklatura structure significantly and its representation was quite small only 4 percent during Gorbachev era in comparison to the time yet to come.

Second, as 1991 August Coup showed, during 1980s 'old-style garrison state' oriented structures predominated within secret intelligence structure. Putin formally resigned from the state security services on 20. August, 1991, during the KGB-supported abortive putsch against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The new generation of secret intelligence structure which reached its power during 1990s was more flexible (which is crucial for inner political maneu-

¹⁵² Timothy J. Colton and Cindy Skach, "Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post-Communist Europe: Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities," http://www.clubmadrid.org/cmadrid/fileadmin/4-Colton_Skach.pdf (Search date: 2007/03/17)

vering) and its apex had broader and higher education comparing to the previous one which had partly been restrained from at that time still powerful post-Stalin nomenklatura structures (ex: Vladimir Putin, Sergei Ivanov, Nikolai Patrushev).

“The military people recruited by Putin have gone through the school of democratization and have worked in the private sector and abroad, so their authoritarianism has been modernized.”¹⁵³

Third and the most important factor: It was not possible to mobilize the declining Soviet economy in order to respond to the technologically new military build up. The transformation of the economy was indispensable. Even the most strictness state and social constraint could not bring back to life dying economy overtaken by widely spread corruption and inefficiency. In the early 1980s any impetuous economic transformation could cause even further amplification of the corruption within nomenklatura structure and the collapse of the entire state. This was the reason for Andropov’s cautiousness regarding the economic transformation of the state.

If the entire economic and social reform of late 1980s led to disintegration of the Soviet Union, then the emergence of business elite as its by-product together with the reinforced and strengthened secret intelligence represented the fourth service-class revolution’s missing elements.

Indeed, according to Kryshatanovskaya and White’s report business representatives had increased their presence in the elite from 1.6 percent in 1993 to 11.3 percent in 2002.¹⁵⁴ The data regarding 2001 showed:

¹⁵³ Olga Kryshatanovskaya, *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁴ Olga Kryshatanovskaya and Stephen White (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 293.

“Big business commanded 17 per cent of seats in the State Duma as well as 16 per cent of positions with the presidential staff, 8 per cent of governorships, and 4 per cent of the membership of the Cabinet of Ministers.”¹⁵⁵

Other, recent data regarding the proportion of key decision-making positions that are held by individuals from the world of business among Russia’s top leadership, Duma deputies, government and regional elite, also indicates that

“In almost every category the proportion of business representatives has increased and across all categories the representation of business more than trebled, reaching a remarkable 20% of government ministers.”¹⁵⁶

The influx of entrepreneurs into the corridors of power should serve the development and facilitation of open market economy. Secret intelligence structure combined with entrepreneurs started possessing capability to initiate formation of the new state form – ‘militocracy’ with the characteristics of open market economy.

In accordance with Richard Hellie’s service-class revolution theory this structure could represent the new form of ‘garrison state;’ yet, with very different economic foundation, comparing to the previous service-class revolutions.

Therefore I should expect to find among data related to the period of Russia’s transition during Putin presidency that the level of open market economy development has increased, and the level of democratization has decreased. Additionally, I will compare the data from this period to the period of Russia’s transition towards democracy

¹⁵⁵ Olga Kryshanskaya and Stephen White, “Generations and the Conversion of Power in Postcommunist Russia,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2002), p. 236.

¹⁵⁶ Olga Kryshanskaya and Stephen White, “The Rise of the Russian Business Elite,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2005), p. 302.

with the open market economy during Yeltsin in order to confirm that Russia's transition after Yeltsin has been shifted in other direction. As a further confirmation that secret intelligence structure influenced the transformation and the formation of Russian Federation's state structures I am going to compare its transition with ex-Soviet (Visegrad group and Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania), and some other ex-socialist Balkan countries, which have been in transition towards democracy with open market economy.

The first reason for choosing Visegrad Group, Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania, as our benchmark countries, is their successful transition to democracy with the open market economy which resulted with integration into European Union.

The second reason is that all those countries were the closest to the 'Western Block' countries of Europe and overtaken by Soviet Union during and after the Second World War. Therefore, it can be assumed that those countries during the Soviet period had developed strong secret services for the purposes of inner state surveillance and spying on their western neighbors.

Although at that time all those countries developed secret services, their scope of actions was limited by the constant subordinations to KGB. Even for the fiercest one, Romanian secret service *Securitate*, which played an important role in Nicolae Ceaușescu's dictatorship:

“From that very moment, all the intelligence and security services became an instrument to promote the rapid communization of Romania, subordinated to the Soviet masters, the NKGB/MGB.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Łukasz Kamiński, Krzysztof Persak and Anna Piekarska (ed.), “The Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe, 1944–1945 to 1989: Abstracts of Presentations,” presented at the International Conference, Warsaw, June 16–18, 2005, p. 60.

The situation was not different with the other secret services from our benchmark states. The inflow of foreign currency that KGB had¹⁵⁸ and the centralization of secret intelligence system within the Soviet Union were important if not, crucial for the non-development of strong secret intelligence structures within ex-Soviet states. No-menklatura structure was well developed; yet, without significant influence on transition of our benchmark states.

Therefore, in the following data analysis related to our benchmark states, we are expecting that both, the level of democracy and the level of market openness had been simultaneously increased during transition period.

If I compare the changes in GDP per capita (PPP)¹⁵⁹ in the above enumerated countries, in all graphs (figure 1, 2, 3...) the similar pattern of transition can be noticed. It indicates bigger or smaller recovery after the economic collapse that happened in the first 2-3 years of the transition. The only exception was Russia which had a continuous decline of GDP per capita (PPP) until 1999 (with an exception of the year 1997).

For both Visegrad group and Baltic States (see figure 1 and figure 2) the period of economic declination (collapse) lasted from the beginning of the transition in 1990 (Visegrad group) – 1991 (Baltic States) until 1992 in some cases 1993. After that point all of them

¹⁵⁸ One example: In 1970 KGB was behind the trade of Khrushchev's memoirs, which were sold at that time for 1.1 million dollars.

Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, *op. cit.*, pp. 226–260.

¹⁵⁹ We use PPP calculations of GDP rather than calculations based on market exchange rates (MER) to perform our comparisons, since the economic basis of MER statistics is flawed for international comparisons. Particularly, developing countries grow slower with a purchasing power exchange rate than with a market exchange rate. Different exchange rates may lead to scenarios with very different per capita income.

achieved, with bigger or smaller fluctuations, a gradual increase in GDP per capita (PPP). These economic transformations were successfully followed by the uplifts in the level of political freedom¹⁶⁰ (see figure 5 and figure 6) and freedom of the press¹⁶¹ (see figure 7 and figure 8), which in most of the cases was following the changes in the GDP per capita (PPP). On the other hand, the level of political freedom and the freedom of the press in Russia started declining after 1998-99 even though its GDP per capita (PPP) has been increasing since 1998-99 (see figure 1, figure 5, and figure 7).

The transition of Romania, Bulgaria, and other Balkan socialist states (ex-Yugoslavia states and Albania) was similar to the transition of Visegrad group and Baltic States. The period of economic collapse in the first 3 years of transition, was followed by the period of economic recovery (see figure 3 and figure 4). Yet, the countries which were not a part of either West or East Block during Cold War, like Albania and (Yugoslavia) Serbia and Montenegro, which developed totalitarian regimes with independent secret services,¹⁶² during the period of transition had a slow increase in the level of democracy.¹⁶³ Furthermore, the significant democratic transformations and a grad-

¹⁶⁰ To determine the relative political freedoms of these countries we draw again on Freedom House (1988-2005) data, which rates countries according to their level of political freedom on a scale of one to seven. We consider the years 1989-2004 and have rescaled this index so that one means the least political freedom and seven means the most.

¹⁶¹ Freedom House's media freedom index assigns points to countries on the basis of three equally-weighted categories related to media's independence from government to create a composite score of media freedom between zero and 100.

¹⁶² *Sigurimi* (Drejtorija e Sigurimit të Shtetit) was Albania's secret police agency during the communist regime;
OZNA (Organ Zaštite Naroda (Armije)) was a security agency of the communist Yugoslavia.

¹⁶³ "Freedom in the World Historical Rankings: Comparative scores for all countries from 1973 to 2006," *Freedom House*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15> (Search date: 2007/03/21)

ual increase in the level of democratic transformation of the states happened only after 2000.¹⁶⁴

Serbia and Montenegro's economic transformation and a slow but gradual increase in GDP per capita (PPP) was going on during the entire period of 90s (with exception of 1999 during NATO bombing) in spite of economic sanctions (1991-1996) and wars. Yugoslavia after the Second World War developed a very strong secret intelligence, especially after Tito-Stalin split in 1948. Its scope was not as wide as KGB. It was more focused on inner state control and surveillance. During the Cold War the economic development mixed with totalitarian regime, international position between two Blocks, and complex multiethnic situation, raised power and importance of secret intelligence and its structure within Yugoslavian nomenklatura system. The anchorage of that structure was the Capital city of Yugoslavia, due to high 'power vertical' established under supreme leader Tito. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as its successor continued with the same organizational schema due to the totalitarian pretension of Slobodan Milosevic. State Security Service (SDB) as a successor of the previous Yugoslavia's secret intelligence *Organ Zaštite Naroda (Armije)* – OZNA inherited its structures, functions and purposes. Its power was very high during 1990s and dominated comparing to the leading nomenklatura structure, because Milosevic dictatorship similarly to Stalin's, directly relied on secret intelligence and its structure. At that time, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represented plural-party political system; therefore, the strategy of secret intelligence changed

¹⁶⁴ Regarding Serbia and Montenegro, "Freedom in the World Historical Rankings: Comparative scores for all countries from 1973 to 2006," has data only after the year 2004.

comparing to the previous times. During Jovica Stanisic chairmanship in SDB 1991-1997, the strategy of secret intelligence was building up the network composed of both ruling and opposition parties, thus absorbing and transforming different political environment into the mold of secret intelligence structure.¹⁶⁵ Even without privatization, the state turned to market economy, with the big restriction for its development into the open market economy due to economic sanctions.

Therefore (see figure 4), after 1993-94 a gradual increase in Serbia and Montenegro's GDP per capita (PPP) can be noticed, similarly to Russia in the period after 1998-99. The power of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's secret intelligence in the transformation of the state structures towards politically and economically new form of the state was impressive, considering circumstances in which it occurred. The most important thing for my research is the same pattern, between Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 1990s and Russia after 1998-99: The increased growth in economical transformation towards market economy and the decline in the level of democracy.¹⁶⁶

I have already mentioned that nomenklatura structure in communist states in order to preserve its privileges and to secure them for its heirs became corruptive. Secret intelligence structure in Russia after

¹⁶⁵ "Državna bezbednost za šest godina promenila samo ime: Šef kabineta direktora BIA nekada pratio Draškovića," *Blic Online* (Oct. 13, 2006), <http://www.blic.co.yu/blic/arhiva/2006-10-13/naslovna.htm> (Search date: 2006/10/13)

¹⁶⁶ In Serbia, after assignation of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjich, there was debate regarding transformation of State Security Agency (BIA). It was stated that disband of this agency is not possible in the way it has been done in ex-Soviet countries due to the fact that during Soviet time they were subordinate to the KGB. The given suggestion for transformation was the creation of inner secret security agency controlling mechanism.
"Državna bezbednost za šest godina promenila samo ime: Stranke su u mreži," *Blic Online* (Oct. 14, 2006), <http://www.blic.co.yu/blic/arhiva/2006-10-14/strane/tema.htm> (Search date: 2006/10/14)

it again came to power intended to crack down on corruption within the state bureaucracy and nomenklatura structure, consolidate society, restore public order, and strengthen state power.

Hence, I should expect that the level of corruption in Russia has declined under Putin. On the other side, it should be increased or at least it should fluctuate around some constant value in our benchmark states, due to the preserved nomenklatura structure's power and the corruption through privatization and FDI.

As a conformation that the level of corruption¹⁶⁷ in Russia has declined from the year 2000 can be seen in figure 9 and figure 10. This followed with slow increase in FDI from 2001 – 2003. After 2003 FDI in Russian Federation has started rising considerably (see figure 11). The increase in FDI can also indicate the increase in the level of market openness.

The level of corruption in Visegrad group shows a gradual increase in Poland and Czech Republic and the fluctuation around the constant value in Hungary and Slovakia (see figure 9). The same fluctuation can be found in the Baltic States. The only exception is Latvia where the level of corruption has declined during the entire transition period (see figure 10). However, in comparison to the other benchmark states, it had the highest level of corruption at the beginning of transition (almost as high as Russia).

According to Bertelsmann Transformation Index,¹⁶⁸ in 2006 Russia held the 47th place behind any other benchmark state (see figure 12). Together with Serbia and Montenegro and Albania it belonged to

¹⁶⁷ We start by comparing the perceived level of corruption in Russia with that of our benchmark countries using TI's survey data. Scores are rescaled from zero (least corrupt) to ten (most corrupt).

¹⁶⁸ "Status Index," *Bertelsmann Transformation Index*, <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/37.0.html?&L=1> (Search date: 2007/03/21)

the group of countries which has ‘deficiencies in terms of a market-based democracy;’ with the prospect for economic transformation, and stagnation in political transformation. Hence, in 2006 it moved from the 41st place, which it occupied in 2003, to the 47th place (see figure 12).

Chapter VI. Conclusion

In the beginning, as a part of military crystallization, secret intelligence's scope and functions were limited and subordinated to military purposes. However, with the raise of 'political' citizenship and institutionalization of the state the need for 'social stabilizer' emerged, especially in countries with sensitive geopolitical positions and complex societies. As a result, secret intelligence's functions and purposes had diverged from the previous subordination to the military. Even though secret intelligences were created due to changes in the concept of war throughout the time they become factor of changes of many political and social concepts. The Soviet secret intelligence under Stalin started to develop as another form of military crystallization, altering the previous concept of war. This directly had repercussion in US, causing creation of the resembling 'new generation' secret intelligence. With the progress in communication technology importance and power of secret intelligence strengthened even more. Throughout the history Russia had shown tendencies to respond to the great external threat with the raise of 'garrison state' and inner social restrictive consolidation; in other words, with the 'service-class revolution.' From the mid-1990s Russian secret intelligence strengthened its power and started shifting transition and altering transformation of the state towards the new form of garrison state – 'militocracy with open market economy.' This form was adequate and up to date with domestic and international contemporary politico-socio-economical environment.

Secret intelligence has played a very important role in the formation and transformation of Russian state structures after the

October Revolution. My empirical examination and theoretical analysis have shown that:

- Secret intelligence has played important role in transformation of post-Soviet Russia's state structures.

Empirical confirmation has been made through the comparison of the transition and transformation of Russian state with the ex-Soviet states which successfully passed transition towards democracy with the open market economy, and with some ex-communist state that resemble Soviet model in terms of comparable development of secret intelligence structures.

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Appendix

Table 1

FEDERAL DISTRICTS AND POWER MINISTRY PERSONNEL, MID 2002

Federal District	Deputies with Power Ministry Background	Main Federal Inspectors with Power Ministry Background	Totals
<i>Central</i>	3 of 8 (FSB, VS, FSNP)	10 of 18 (4 FSB, 2 MVD, 2 VS, 1 FSNP, 1 ZhDV)	13 of 26 (50%)
<i>Northwest</i>	4 of 6 (2 FSB, 1 VS, 1 Procuracy)	7 of 10 (2 VS, 2 FSNP, 1 FSB, 1 MVD, 1 Procuracy)	11 of 16 (69%)
<i>Volga</i>	1 of 6 (Procuracy)	6 of 13 (MVD, FSB, VS, MChS, FSNP, FPS)	7 of 19 (37%)
<i>Southern</i>	2 of 7 (VS, MVD)	5 of 9 (3 VS, 2 MVD)	7 of 16 (44%)
<i>Urals</i>	1 of 5 (FSB)	3 of 6 (FSB, MVD, VS)	4 of 11 (36%)
<i>Siberian</i>	2 of 6 (FSB, FSNP)	2 of 11 (MVD, FSB)	4 of 17 (24%)
<i>Far Eastern</i>	3 of 6 (3 VS)	1 of 8 (FPS)	4 of 14 (29%)
Totals	16 of 44 (36%)	34 of 75 (45%)	50 of 119 (42%)

Source: *Rambler.Ru: Российская власть* [<http://Vlast.rambler.ru/>]

Key: FSB = Federal Security Service; VS = Armed Forces; FSNP = Federal Tax Police; MVD = Ministry of Internal Affairs; ZhDV = Railroad Troops; MChS = Ministry of Emergency Situations; FPS = Federal Border Service

Figure 1 PPP Estimates of Per Capita GDP (1990 Dollars), Russia vs. the Visegrad Group




Figure 2 Index of PPP Estimates of Per Capita GDP (1990 Dollars), Russia vs. the Baltic States




Figure 3 PPP Estimates of Per Capita GDP (1990 Dollars)
Russia vs. Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania







Figure 4 Index of PPP Estimates of Per Capita GDP
Russia vs. the Former Yugoslavia




**Figure 5 Democracy
Russia vs. the Visegrad Group**



**Figure 6 Democracy
Russia vs. the Baltic States**



**Figure 7 Press Freedom
Russia vs. the Visegrad Group**



**Figure 8 Press Freedom
Russia vs. the Baltic States**




Figure 9 **Corruption**
Russia vs. the Visegrad Group






Figure 10 **Corruption**
Russia vs. the Baltic States



**Figure 11 Russian Federation
FDI Inflows**



Source: FDI.net

Figure 12 Bertelsmann Transformation Status Index

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9,55	▲	9,36	▲	9,45	Slovenia	1	2
9,40	▲	9,18	▲	9,29	Estonia	2	6
9,45	▲	9,00	▲	9,23	Czech Republic	3	2
9,35	▲	9,00	▲	9,18	Taiwan	4	8
9,40	▲	8,93	▲	9,16	Hungary	5	1
9,20	▲	8,93	▲	9,06	Slovakia	6	2
9,25	▲	8,79	▲	9,02	Lithuania	7	2
8,90	▲	9,07	▲	8,99	South Korea	8	8
9,20	▲	8,61	▲	8,90	Poland	9	7
9,10	▲	8,61	▲	8,85	Chile	10	8
9,10	▲	8,32	▲	8,71	Croatia	11	15
9,40	▲	8,00	▲	8,70	Costa Rica	12	11
9,90	▲	7,43	▲	8,66	Uruguay	13	13
8,30	▲	8,11	▲	8,20	Latvia	14	12
8,58	▲	7,75	▲	8,17	Mauritius	15	–
8,45	▲	7,50	▲	7,98	Botswana	16	14
8,45	▲	7,50	▲	7,98	Bulgaria	16	18
8,70	▲	7,25	▲	7,98	South Africa	16	16
8,20	▲	7,57	▲	7,89	Romania	19	21
7,90	▲	7,79	▲	7,84	Brazil	20	22
8,70	▲	6,46	▲	7,58	Jamaica	21	17
5,35	▲	9,21	▲	7,28	Singapore	22	19
6,85	▲	7,68	▲	7,26	Thailand	23	23
7,85	▲	6,57	▲	7,21	Argentina	24	25
7,95	▲	6,46	▲	7,21	India	24	29
7,70	▲	6,61	▲	7,15	Namibia	26	20
7,55	▲	6,71	▲	7,13	Mexico	27	24
7,55	▲	6,64	▲	7,10	Panama	28	–
7,55	▲	6,61	▲	7,08	Macedonia	29	34
7,35	▲	6,64	▲	7,00	El Salvador	30	25
7,90	▲	6,07	▲	6,99	Ghana	31	59
7,10	▲	6,82	▲	6,96	Ukraine	32	44
7,40	▲	6,50	▲	6,95	Serbia and Montenegro	33	29
7,05	▲	6,79	▲	6,92	Turkey	34	25
7,75	▲	5,54	▲	6,64	Senegal	35	35
6,00	▲	7,25	▲	6,63	Sri Lanka	36	37
7,25	▲	5,96	▲	6,61	Albania	37	38
6,80	▲	6,43	▲	6,61	Bosnia-Herzegovina	37	50
6,85	▲	6,29	▲	6,57	Peru	39	38
7,50	▲	5,39	▲	6,45	Madagascar	40	50
6,95	▲	5,86	▲	6,40	Philippines	41	46
7,30	▲	5,43	▲	6,36	Dominican Republic	42	25
7,05	▲	5,54	▲	6,29	Mongolia	43	29
6,10	▲	6,43	▲	6,26	Armenia	44	46
7,60	▲	4,93	▲	6,26	Benin	44	41
4,92	▲	7,50	▲	6,21	Bahrain	46	50
5,70	▲	6,57	▲	6,14	Russia	47	41
5,85	▲	6,36	▲	6,10	Colombia	48	46
7,35	▲	4,86	▲	6,10	Mali	48	29
5,07	▲	7,11	▲	6,09	Malaysia	50	29

Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) (2007)

1- Result Political Transformation
3-Result Economic Transformation
5-Status index
7- Ranking 2006

2-Trend in Democratic Development (2001 – 2005)
4-Trend in Economic Development (2001 – 2005)
6-Countries;
8-Ranking 2003